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HIV/AIDS is an urgent health issue in many areas of the world, particularly in Africa. In addition 
to reaching pandemic status, HIV/AIDS is also being elevated to the level of a security threat. 
While this is occurring both nationally and internationally, the United Nations is leading this 
securitization attempt. The UN has been able to engage in this attempt as it is the most influential 
international organization and the leading norm promoting organization. Securitization is an 
analytic process that traces how issues become identified and understood as security threats. This 
concept originated within the Copenhagen school of security studies, and this is the framework 
that this paper relies on to analyze the connection between HIV/AIDS and security.  
 
The connection between HIV/AIDS and security is now widely internalized, accepted and even 
promoted by national governments, international organizations, and non-governmental 
organizations. However, the successful securitization of HIV/AIDS has yet to be fully explored, 
understood, or tested. This paper undertakes this task, and relies on the Copenhagen process of 
securitization to trace the security discourse initiated from the UN, down through four selected 
case studies. It identifies which of the key Copenhagen requirements for securitization have been 
met, and which have not been met, ultimately leading to the conclusion that the United Nations 
prompted a successful internal securitization and an unsuccessful external securitization. 
 
This paper concludes that the current Copenhagen school process of securitization is flawed and 
is inadequate for studying today’s emerging non-traditional threats. In particular, it is unable to 
trace the securitization of HIV/AIDS as a result of stringent and unrepresentative criterions. It 
attempts to move forward by offering a rationale and direction to begin updating the Copenhagen 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
  
HIV/AIDS is one of the most urgent and pressing health issues of the past several 
decades; it has widespread and complex economic, social, political and international 
implications. The consequences and impacts of the spread of HIV/AIDS manifest differently 
within developed and developing countries, as well as between those who have access to medical 
care and those who do not. For many within developed regions such as North America, 
HIV/AIDS is a generally foreign virus; a health issue that while it has no cure, is now 
manageable with access to the right medication. For other regions, particularly Sub-Saharan 
Africa, it represents a devastating and terrifying reality, and a daily grim fate that is almost as 
destructive for those who are not infected as it is for those who are. As different as the 
experiences are for individuals, the reality for states and the international system as a whole is 
equally complex. The potential security implications of the spread of HIV/AIDS for states in the 
global system are multifaceted and require urgent attention and further study. Ultimately, 
regardless of the observable impacts, how HIV/AIDS is framed has a direct impact on how it is 
recognized and addressed.  
This paper attempts to delve into the problem of how to study the dynamics of HIV/AIDS 
from a security perspective. In order to adequately examine this issue, first and foremost this 
paper traces the framing of HIV/AIDS as security issue by applying the process of securitization 
as developed by the Copenhagen School.1 From initial reviews of the existing literature and the 
ongoing debate surrounding HIV/AIDS and security, it has become clear that there are various 
                                                 
1 Securitization is a concept, developed within the Copenhagen school of security studies. It describes the discursive 
recognition and elevation of an existential threat to the level of a recognized security issue. This process is described 
in detail in Chapter 3. HIV/AIDS refers to Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and the Acquired 
Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS), hereby referred to collectively as HIV/AIDS.  
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divides on this topic. This study reviews the process, the actors involved and the mechanisms that 
have initiated the attempt to securitize HIV/AIDS, whether fully realized or not. In other words, it 
traces how HIV/AIDS has been elevated to the level of a security issue within the international 
system, by identifying the extent of the internalization of HIV/AIDS as a security issue within 
both the national and international systems. It begins by arguing that the United Nations initiated 
the attempt to securitize HIV/AIDS and in turn prompted and influenced states to begin 
approaching the issue in the same manner. The following chapters review several key areas of 
security studies, the context of HIV/AIDS as a pandemic, previous connections between 
HIV/AIDS and security, and the process of securitization itself. It then studies in more depth, 
how successful HIV/AIDS securitization attempts have been within the United Nations itself, and 
within four selected governments.  
In order to ensure clarity in the following chapters, two key questions need to be 
answered: what is a threat? And moreover, what is security? These concepts are elusively 
subjective and yet willingly invoked all too often. In the non-academic and non-theoretical sense, 
security and threat are used so often that there is no pause taken to reflect on their meanings, or 
the qualifications that should be applied to differentiate them from everyday dangers and risks. In 
an academic and theoretical sense, these two words have very specific but strongly contested 
meanings. Security and threat have always been invoked to justify inter and intra state wars, 
espionage, terrorism, arrests, killings, mass murders, genocide, and conversely, peace, diplomacy, 
international laws, the United Nations, and the list goes on. Can there be one all encompassing 
definition of threat or should the definition be flexible enough to identify what cannot yet be 
anticipated? It is not possible to be certain as to what does and does not constitute a threat in a 
general sense. In turn, what constitutes security and insecurity needs to be both critically 
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analyzed and developed based on situational and regional considerations. It is in part for this 
reason that this paper selected the Copenhagen school, found within the critical security studies 
(CSS) framework, as the framework from which to study HIV/AIDS and security. This 
framework explains that security is discursively built, and not in fact singularly defined.2 In 
comparison with the other relevant frameworks, this paper finds that the Copenhagen school is at 
the same time both more focused, and less restrictive, because it does not confine the analyst to 
interpret through one predefined lens. The framework provides the analyst with the ability to 
focus more on the real and practical understandings of security, on a case-by-case basis. It allows 
for the study of how actors understand, present, and in turn address security issues, and it 
therefore offers the most suitable security school under which today’s issues can begin to be 
studied. While many schools are either too narrow or too broad in their focus on the actors and 
the systems, the Copenhagen school avoids such problems by remaining open to the possibility of 
studying security from a variety of levels, and does not focus on one specific actor. It allows for a 
state-centric analysis, but it does not recognize the state as the only relevant actor or referent. 
They explain that, “we have constructed a wider conceptual net within which the state-centric 
position is possible but not a predetermined outcome.”3 While some would see this as unfocused 
or too broad, in practice it allows for a more realistic study of what is actually occurring without 
imposing the theory’s own restraints on the outcomes of the study. The Copenhagen school 
maintains conceptual focus and clarity by requiring very specific actions to occur before 
accepting successful securitization. Finally, the framework’s understanding and treatment of 
security, allows it to step back from the debates regarding widening or maintaining narrower 
security definitions. 
                                                 
2 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder and London: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998). 
3 Ibid., 37.  
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Using the Copenhagen school as the framework, this paper argues that the United Nations 
(UN) has played a key role in how HIV/AIDS is now understood internationally. It was the 
securitizing actor, in both an internal (within the organization), and an external (global) attempt 
to securitize HIV/AIDS. This paper argues that the UN prompted a successful internal 
securitization of HIV/AIDS, which when accepted, initiated an external global call for the 
securitization of HIV/AIDS. As a result, four government studies (Canada, the United States, 
Botswana, and Zimbabwe) are relied on to trace how successful the call for a global 
securitization of HIV/AIDS was. This paper ultimately finds that according to the Copenhagen 
process of securitization, the attempt was unsuccessful. However, it also finds that the audiences 
(four governments) accepted the framing of HIV/AIDS as a security issue, and they frequently 
address the issue as such within their own policies and approaches. As a result, it is concluded 
that there is at least an internalization of the issue as a security threat. The study highlighted flaws 
within the Copenhagen framework, and in turn, this paper concludes that while the framework is 
still quite important and capable of studying most of today’s security issues, it needs to be 
updated to account for how states currently interact within the international system and how they 
react to global security threats. To prompt future development within the Copenhagen 
framework, this paper concludes by proposing several key areas that should be reevaluated, 
including: the requirement of the threat to be presented as existential, the requirement for action 
beyond the normal political procedure, the requirement for emergency measures, and finally the 
designation of referents as objects and not actors. The conclusions are intended as the starting 
point for future research into this issue and framework. 
The ensuing chapters begin by clarifying the overall critical framework, the theoretical 
background, and in particular, the key concepts and processes of securitization. The second 
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chapter provides a thorough review of the theoretical background, including current and relevant 
literature on traditional security studies, human security, critical security studies, and particularly 
focusing on the Copenhagen school. It also reviews HIV/AIDS, HIV/AIDS as a security issue or 
threat, the United Nations as a norm promoting organization, and the involvement of the UN in 
the endorsement of HIV/AIDS as a threat and or security issue. The third chapter focuses on the 
theoretical framework, detailing the process of securitization by clarifying each step of the 
process. The chapter concludes by outlining the purpose and methodology of the research. The 
fourth chapter provides analysis of the role that the United Nations played in the attempt to 
internationally securitize HIV/AIDS as well as the influence of the UN in the institutionalization 
of HIV/AIDS in national government policy. The fifth chapter traces the process of securitization 
of HIV/AIDS within the four chosen governments (Canada, the United States, Botswana and 
Zimbabwe) and traces the degree to which HIV/AIDS is framed as a security issue. Finally, the 
sixth chapter discusses the results, conclusions of the research, and finally proposes areas of the 




















CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Review of Relevant Theoretical Frameworks 
  
The following sections review the various relevant security frameworks, in order to 
justify why the Copenhagen framework was ultimately selected as the most appropriate for this 
study. As well, through reviews of the current more non-traditional frameworks, the groundwork 




Traditional security issues, such as a nuclear threat or a military attack, are readily 
identifiable as security issues and thus in both policy decisions and academic research, such 
threats can be clearly identified, analyzed, or promptly addressed. Security from this perspective 
is defined very narrowly, with a singular focus: protection and preservation of the state. The 
traditional referent of security is the state, and traditional threats are widely accepted to be 
military or political threats. States are recognized as the only actors and security is gained 
through military power.4 Traditional security studies focus on war and have been defined as “the 
study of the threat, use, and control of military force.”5 Furthermore, this realm of “security 
studies assumes that conflict between states is always a possibility and that the use of military 
force has far-reaching effects on states and societies.”6  
 The focus of this section is Realist theory. Realism itself is not a single unified theory; it 
contains different variations and has continued to evolve since its inception.7 The clearest 
                                                 
4 Ken Booth, Critical Security Studies and World Politics (Boulder Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 32. 
5 Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” International Studies Quarterly, V. 35, No. 2 (June, 
1991), 212. 
6 Walt, 212. Walt also refers us back to Joseph S. Nye and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "International Security Studies: 
Report of a Conference on the State of the Field," International Security 12:4 (1988). 
7 Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” 212. 
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distinctions within, are made between classical realist theory and neorealist/structural realist 
theory. Classical realists, such as Hans Morgenthau, focus on individuals and how they are 
naturally inclined to pursue power and are driven to dominate, which inevitably leads to fighting 
and war. Such views of security only recognize military and/or political threats to the security of 
the state. They hold the belief that states only act in their own national interest in order to gain or 
maintain power. This is done first and foremost through the use of force.8 
Neorealists, or structural realists, particularly Kenneth Waltz, have focused beyond the 
role of human nature and acknowledge the role of the international system. They argue that the 
anarchic international system, lacking an authority that states can rely on for protection, forces 
states to ensure their own survival. In other words, it is state against state, each constantly trying 
to preserve power and their own national interests.9 The anarchic nature of the system therefore 
makes security the ultimate focus of states. This can lead to the fundamental security dilemma, as 
each state strives to maintain security through gaining power, “what one does to enhance one’s 
own security causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure.”10  
There is a divide within structural realism itself, between those who are classified as 
defensive realists and those who are classified as offensive realists. Defensive realists, such as 
Waltz, argue against pursuing power and hegemony to the maximum, because it would be 
counterproductive as demonstrated above with the security dilemma. Offensive realists, such as 
John Mearsheimer, follow the opposite logic. They argue that it is necessary within the anarchic 
system, to ensure that the state continues to gain and maintain the most power possible. Power is 
                                                 
8 Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” International Relations (Spring 1998), 31. 
9 Walt, “International Relations,” 31. 
10 Barry R. Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Survival, 35 (Spring 1993), 2. 
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the ultimate goal, because it ensures security; as a result, offensive realists argue for the pursuit of 
hegemony.11   
Security is synonymous with power, and therefore states exist in a constant struggle and 
competition for power. Structural realist explanations for this competition are based on five basic 
assumptions about the international system. 1) “Great powers are the main actors in world 
politics, operating in an anarchic system.” 2) “All states possess offensive military capacity.” 3) 
“States can never be certain about the intentions of other states.” 4) “The main goal of states is 
survival.” And 5) “States are rational actors… capable of coming up with sound strategies that 
maximize their prospects for survival.”12 Through the assumptions outlined above, incentives for 
state aggression can be understood. John Mearsheimer explains that three patterns emerge: “first, 
states in the international system fear each other… fear is a potent force in world politics;” 
“second, each state in the international system aims to guarantee its own survival;” and “third, 
states in the international system aim to maximize their relative power position over other 
states.”13    
Although states struggle for power, realists in general agree that states do in fact 
cooperate within this system, albeit, cooperation has its limits. As a result, for realists, real peace 
is unlikely.14 Mearsheimer underscores why cooperation, if it occurs, is difficult to maintain: 
because states are faced with “relative-gains considerations and concern about cheating.”15 When 
states do cooperate, it is the balance-of-power logic that motivates them to cooperate by forming 
                                                 
11 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” Journal of International Affairs, No. 44 (1990), 36. 
And Timothy Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, “Realism’, in J. Baylis and S. Smith, and P. Owens (eds), The 
Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Fourth Edition (2008), 72. 
12 Dunne and Schmidt, “Realism’, 73-74. This chapter is quoted because the excerpts are succinct and clearly 
articulate these five basic assumptions. However, they are explored and explained in greater depth in both John J. 
Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, V. 19, No. 3 (Winter, 1994-
1995), 10; and Waltz, “Realist Thought.” 
13 Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” 11.  
14 Ibid., 9. 
15 Ibid., 12.  
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alliances against common enemies. Ultimately, realism is pessimistic about states and their 
selfish pursuit of power. It is assumed that since all states are driven by the same goal, for more 
power, war is inevitable.16 In turn, realist understandings of security are rigid and strictly 
regimented by rules governing how states act and how they interact within the international 
system.    
 In such a framework, there is no room to recognize the current developments of the 
international system. Methodologically, traditional security studies are unable to account for 
alternative conceptions of security. Security, threats and referent objects are understood 
objectively as established concepts that are not socially constructed.17 Traditional frameworks for 
studying security are neither applicable nor analytically useful for studying HIV/AIDS as a 
security threat. The fundamental problem with such conservative definitions of security is that 
global insecurity has become much more complex. The military can no longer be considered the 
sole locus for security and states are no longer the sole international actors. There are many more 
actors involved in current security deliberations. The international system can no longer be 
understood through a realist lens alone. In addition, the changing roles of international 
organizations, particularly the United Nations, are not reconcilable with traditional security 
studies; the presence and action of the UN challenges the traditionalist assumptions of actors and 
actions within the international system. States, societies, and the international community as a 
whole have evolved and developed in ways that now foster the development of previously 
unrecognizable security issues.18 These issues threaten various groups at every level, from the 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 48.  
17 Ole Waever Barry Buzan, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder and London: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 207. 
18 Barry Buzan identifies these issues as occurring within four non-traditional categories: environmental, political, 
social, and ecological. Steve Smith, "The Contested Concept of Security," in Critical Security Studies and World 
Politics, ed. Ken Booth (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 32. 
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individual to the global population. Many of the threats that arise today, including environmental 
and health related threats, are unable to be identified or analyzed as security issues within 
traditional security studies.  
The following further highlights some the most frequently invoked critiques of the 
traditional state-centric approach to security. Ken Booth presents an extensive review of the most 
vehemently argued critiques of realism. He summarizes that realism: 1) is not realistic because it 
offers an incomplete representation of world relationships; 2) is a misnomer, because it presents a 
perception of the world, not a representation of the world; 3) is a static theory, because it cannot 
account for the future and instead envisages a constant present; 4) its methodology is 
unsophisticated, because it is based on a common sense understanding of how the system 
operates; 5) it fails the test of practice, and instead it actually contributes to the suffering of 
victims by constructing and perpetuating a world politics that ignores the security of the majority 
of the world’s population; 6) its assumptions are in fact regressive, by ignoring how the world 
works and what is held as important, it disregards the realities we face today; 7) its agenda is too 
narrow, that is based on the perceived strategic interests of states; 8) its ethics are actually hostile 
to the human interest, by remaining narrow and selfish with the state as the highest decision 
making body; and finally 9) is intellectually rigid.19 
In a continuation of Booth’s fifth flaw of realism, Pauline Kerr focuses on critiques of the 
state-centric approach from normative, utilitarian and consequential viewpoints. She argues that 
the most recognized critique of the traditional approach is that it is unable and unwilling to 
recognize the “normative human-centric dimensions of security.”20 This argument moves beyond 
                                                 
19 Booth, Critical Security Studies, 5. 
20 Pauline Kerr, “The evolving dialectic between state-centric and human-centric security,” Canberra, Working 




identifying theoretical gaps, and actually argues that there are direct policy consequences 
resulting from ignoring the human security aspect; there is a quality of life aspect missed by 
focusing solely on the state as the locus for security.21 The traditional approach ultimately 
dismisses the security of individuals, and is unable to connect with many key principles of 
international law, particularly humanitarian law.22 
Security is now a highly contested concept. Critical security studies itself grew from an 
environment of discontent with the manner in which traditional studies was unable to explain 
current events. It culminated from the rejection of the “statist and military-oriented assumptions 
of traditional security studies as a means of opening the field to greater theoretical scrutiny and 
debate.”23 The umbrella term CSS provides the impression of a unified framework, however, 
many of the scholars who began working in this area had little else in common except 
dissatisfaction with traditional security studies.24 In addition to Ken Booth, Keith Krause, Michael 
Williams, Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Richard Wyn Jones, Lene Hansen and Jef Huysmans are 
just some of the scholars who have been contributing to the growing body of knowledge that is 
attempting to clarify current security needs and who all explicitly reject the narrow confines of 
traditional security studies.25 CSS, and specifically the Copenhagen school, is discussed in more 
depth in the upcoming section. 
The following section reviews two of the more well-known frameworks within non-
traditional security studies; specifically, human security and the Copenhagen school. By 
                                                 
21 Kerr, 8-9.  
22 Ibid., 11-14.   
23 c.a.s.e. Collective, "Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto," Security Dialogue 37, 
no. 4 (2006), 448. 
24 CSS continues to evolve and develop, but it is still not capable of being identified as a unified and singular 
framework. Instead, there are many differing frameworks that are each developing within what can be understood as 
a critical security framework.  
25 Rens Van Munster, "Security on a Shoestring: A Hitchhiker’s Guide to Critical Schools of Security in Europe," 
Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association 42, no. 2 (2007), 235-236. 
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reviewing human security first, it also helps to further develop this paper’s understanding of 
threats and threat recognition.  
Human Security 
 Human security is a starkly different framework than traditional security studies and it can 
be classified as occurring on the entirely opposite end of the security spectrum. As a security 
framework, human security is loosely defined as both freedom from want and freedom from fear. 
Contrary to traditional security studies, the referents for human security are human beings. 
Threats are often recognized as non-military, and rather than coming from external sources, many 
times the threats arise internally. In this framework, the state itself is often found to be the source 
of the threat.  
The concept of human security is widely used within the non-academic world, and is used 
to justify the focus on non-traditional security threats within both the UN and developed 
countries’ foreign policies. A strong and clear understanding of human security is vital before 
exploring the deeper and more complex theoretical concepts. Human security continues to be an 
ambiguous concept, and despite its increasing usage and international political acceptance, it has 
not been clearly defined for the lay reader and even for those experienced in the concept, it holds 
a range of alternative definitions.26 Human security has two overarching connotations: human 
security as a concept and human security as an analytic paradigm. First is human security as a 
concept to strive for and a concept that influences and shapes both national and international 
policies. Human security as a paradigm, allows for an in-depth and holistic analysis of past and 
                                                 
26 Dan Henk, "Human Security: Relevance and Implications," Parameters, Army War College Quarterly  (2005), 91; 




present security issues and it provides an analysis that could not have been attained using 
traditional security frameworks. This distinction is further explored in the paragraphs below.    
Freedom from fear encompasses protection from physical violence and protection of basic 
human rights, and above all, the protection of the right to life. This is considered the narrow end 
of the human security spectrum. Freedom from want is considered the broader understanding of 
human security. It argues that economic development, peace, and overall order cannot be 
achieved within developing countries and failed states without stability, or security. As such, 
political order or restoration is essential and necessary for development.27 
Human security’s background can be traced back to early liberal philosophies, but current 
understandings of human security arose from growing discontent with the traditional security 
paradigm following the end of the Cold War. Taylor Owen identifies that with the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, and despite the so-called balance established by the Cold War, individuals were not 
as safe as they were perceived to be. People were dying from poverty, disease, hunger, violence 
and various human rights violations, and the traditional security worldview was in fact 
camouflaging these threats to individuals.28 Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong have 
further summarized the rise of human security by arguing that there were six motivating factors 
that prompted the rise of human security during the twentieth century: 1) the populations that 
were drafted into armed conflicts changed from smaller numbers of elites to the larger masses; 2) 
the industrial revolution in conjunction with the scientific revolution led to larger numbers of 
citizens being killed in the process of protecting the state (due to various advancements in 
weapons technology); 3) certain states engaged in mass murders of their own populations; 4) 
                                                 
27Taylor Owen, "Challenges and Opportunities for Defining and Measuring Human Security," Disarmament Forum: 
Human Rights, Human Security and Disarmament, no. 3 (2004), 52; Werthes, "Human Security in Practice: 
Canadian and Japanese Experiences," 86. 
28 Owen, "Challenges and Opportunities for Defining and Measuring Human Security,"17. Henk, "Human Security: 
Relevance and Implications," 91. 
 
 14
following decolonization, some states did not possess the capacity to provide security for their 
own populations; 5) the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War prompted an 
international reevaluation of understandings of order and security; and 6) globalization led to 
reduced state prominence and a reevaluation of the focus on military threats and defense.29 It 
could be concluded that human security rose out of the lack of focus on the human impact of 
conflict and instability. To date, there have been many efforts to establish a clear definition of 
human security, but it remains ambiguous due to the fact that that there are differing schools of 
thought, as explained below.  
Human security as a concept became more widely recognized following the publication of 
the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) 1994 Human Development Report.  The 
UNDP report established four defining aspects of human security: first, human security is a 
universal concern; second, its components are interdependent because threats are not confined by 
borders; third, it is more manageable when intervention is early rather than late; and finally its 
focus is on individuals and their interactions within society.30 The United Nations has been deeply 
involved in helping to entrench the conception of human security both nationally and 
internationally. The UN has advanced three broad understandings of human security: human 
rights; freedom from fear; and freedom from want. The UNDP report also offered seven broad 
conceptual guidelines, which it argued, fell under the guidelines of human security. They are: 
economic security threatened by poverty; food security threatened by hunger and famine; health 
security threatened by injury and disease; environmental security threatened by pollution, 
environmental degradation and resource depletion; personal security threatened by various 
                                                 
29 Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong, Human Security and the United Nations: A Critical History (Indiana 
University Press for the UN Intellectual History Project, 2006), 6-9. 
30 Booth, Critical Security Studies and World Politics, 51-52 
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forms of violence; political security threatened by political repression and community security 
threatened by social unrest and instability.31  
 Human security as a paradigm challenges traditional views of the referent of security. As 
opposed to protection of the state against external threats, the focus of human security is the 
protection of individuals from both external and internal threats.32 New approaches for studying 
security are now more necessary than ever because the traditional frameworks for analysis can no 
longer explain many of the threats and events that are occurring. Wars between states are one 
example of this; the policies that were advised to prevent them were understood and created 
within a traditional framework. However, traditional frameworks cannot explain violent conflicts 
within states and presently these now make up over 95% of current armed conflicts.33 
 Similarly to the disagreements found in the larger framework of security studies, within 
the human security paradigm there remains a lack of consensus on many issues, in particular and 
most problematically there is disagreement over the threats that individuals need protection from. 
The disagreements have been generally divided between those who believe there should be a 
widening of the human security paradigm, and those who wish that the paradigm remained more 
narrowly constrained.34 Taylor Owen provides an alternative for those who find the narrow versus 
broad debate futile. He suggests a hybrid definition, one that does not see a difference between 
death from a weapon and death from a natural disaster. Owen created a two-part definition of 
human security, one that offers a more concise understanding of human security. First human 
security is “the protection of the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive 
                                                 
31 UNDP, "Human Development Report 1994,"  (New York and Oxford: United Nations Development Programme, 
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threats.”35 Secondly, he refines the threats that fall under the auspices of human security by 
clarifying that “individuals require protection from environmental, economic, food, health, 
personal and political threats.”36 
To justify his assertions, Owen explains that different harms require vastly different 
policy responses and as a result, all threats should be evaluated bases on their level of severity.37 
Owen argues that only those threats that surpass a defined severity threshold should be included 
under the umbrella of human security. He goes on to clarify what the severity threshold entails 
and how it is defined. The following qualifiers set his so-called threshold: the minimum level of 
survival necessary (vital core) and the severity and immediacy of the threat (critical and 
pervasive threats).38 By adhering to Owen’s threshold definition only the most severe threats, 
those that take or seriously threaten lives, would be identified as human security threats. Owen’s 
conceptual model is promising because, unlike other models, it takes the focus off of the threat 
and places it on the individual and the impact on the individual, and he also bases it on regional 
considerations. Rather than remain confined by a set number of predefined threats that are 
assessed regardless of other regional, political, social and economic considerations, Owen’ s 
threshold definition is flexible enough to be used on a case-by-case basis.  
Human security continues to remain contested and widely critiqued, both on conceptual 
and methodological grounds. Many scholars have argued and continue to argue that the 
expansion of security to include a wider variety of issues will run the risk of diluting the concept, 
making it useless as an analytic tool.39 There are also questions regarding its applicability as a 
                                                 
35 Owen, "Challenges and Opportunities for Defining and Measuring Human Security," 20. 
36 Ibid., 20. Note that Owen has narrowed the threat categories from the UNDP report to only six threats. 
37 Ibid., 20.  
38 Ibid., 20. 
39 Henk, "Human Security: Relevance and Implications"; Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," 
International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 2 (1991), 213; Barry Buzan, Security: A New Framework for Analysis; Helga 
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practical guide for both academic research and governmental policy application.40 These 
questions relate back to the murky definition of human security. Roland Paris points out two 
underlying and interconnected issues which may be undermining the applicability of human 
security for students and practitioners alike: first is the lack of a clear and precise definition. 
Second, is the worry that those most committed to human security have a vested interest in 
maintaining the vague and expansive nature of the term.41 The problems that Paris points to can 
be demonstrated through the differences between the Canadian and Japanese governments 
understandings of human security. Canada adheres more to the narrow freedom from fear 
understanding, which identifies threats to people’s rights, safety and lives. By contrast, Japan 
follows a broader conceptualization of human security, freedom from want. This includes all 
threats that affect the survival, daily life, and dignity of individuals.42 These differences can affect 
much more than the national foreign policies of both Canada and Japan, they can infiltrate and 
confuse the international understanding of human security. As well, the differences can prevent 
coherence within international efforts to unite in global policies and approaches to threats. For 
these reasons, in order to narrow the analytic focus and to also find more conceptual clarity, the 
Copenhagen school is the framework selected. The following briefly reviews critical security 
studies and then engages in a more in depth review the Copenhagen school framework.  
Critical Security Studies and the Copenhagen School  
  
Critical security studies is defined by Steve Smith as a framework that consists of 
“alternatives for security studies to that offered by the mainstream [and] it is explicit in its 
                                                                                                                                                              
Studies Quarterly 35, no. 1 (1991); Simon Dalby, "Contesting an Essential Concept: Reading the Dilemmas in 
Contemporary Security Discourse," in Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, ed. Keith Krause and Michael 
C. Williams (London Rutledge, 1997), 12-18.   
40 Roland Paris, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?" International Security 26, no. 2 (2001), 88.  
41 Ibid., 88. 
42 Ibid., 90. 
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rejection of realism, [but] it does not add up to an alternative theory.”43 The so-called alternatives 
that Smith refers to above are established within various schools of thought, but for this 
discussion the most relevant alternatives are found within the Copenhagen, and Aberystwyth 
schools.44 CSS became more prevalent in international relations following the middle of the 
1990s.45 Originally, the most that the various CSS approaches had in common with each other 
was a mutual dissatisfaction with traditional security studies.46 However, there have been many 
strides forward in the advancement and clarification of the concepts within this area, and this is 
mainly due to an ongoing dialogue and continuum of critiques reverberating between various 
CSS scholars. It is important to reiterate that CSS is not a theory, but what Booth calls “a body of 
knowledge.”47 
As a result of the ongoing variations within each of the above-mentioned schools, there 
are conflicting understandings within critical security studies of what constitutes a security threat. 
For this paper the focus is on the Copenhagen understandings of security, threats, and relevant 
actors, which are discussed in more depth in the ensuing subsection. The variations between the 
different schools’ understandings of security and threat are area of both weakness and strength 
for them, and problems that garner much criticism from other scholars. In part, these differences 
can be beneficial by allowing flexibility in threat identification, but they can also be detrimental 
for the same reasons that are identified within the previous section on human security. 
Regardless, the schools within CSS have made great strides forward and they continue to push 
for clearer methods of threat identification and threat analysis.  
                                                 
43 Smith, "The Contested Concept of Security," 45. 
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The Aberystwyth school focuses mostly on the individual as the referent and it maintains 
a narrower focus than CSS in general.48 The Copenhagen school does not restrict itself to one 
level of referent, and it focuses on the political construction of insecurity and danger. The 
Copenhagen school offers one of the most important developments within CSS, with their 
process of securitization. This process is the central framework for this research and it is 
discussed in depth in the following chapter.49 Unlike the Aberystwyth school, the Copenhagen 
school does not restrict its potential analysis to one level of referent, and this is one of the reasons 
it was selected as the framework for this study. This paper needed a framework that was capable 
of analyzing the complexities of what was practically occurring, without initially restricting the 
area of study. 
Before continuing, it is necessary to address one of the most common critiques of 
widening the security agenda, the ‘security trap.’50 The concept of the ‘security trap’ refers to the 
potentially problematic outcomes of widening the security agenda to include virtually everything, 
which in turn may counteract the original purpose of widening the agenda in the first place. By 
attempting to include more issues under the security umbrella, it is argued that the concept of 
security becomes diluted and that we may actually become more insecure. It is also argued that a 
second problem may also occur in tandem with the first trap. That is, as we attempt to create 
more security, there is the potential to actually create more anxiety.51 These are the risks 
associated with delving into these sorts of issues. The c.a.s.e Collective further summarizes the 
potential problem for scholars exploring security by explaining, “the irony is that even the most 
careful and critical scholar aiming at avoiding the first and second traps might unwillingly 
                                                 
48 Smith, "The Contested Concept of Security," 42; Booth, Critical Security Studies and World Politics. 
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participate in the securitization of new issues when analyzing how these issues are de facto 
framed in terms of security.”52 In moving forward, this problem is recognized and understood to 
be an underlying risk for all who study security in general. Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde also 
point out that, “there are intellectual and political dangers in simply tacking the word security 
onto an ever wider range of issues.”53 In studying and theorizing about security issues, they warn 
that intellectual coherence needs to be upheld. However, maintaining intellectual coherence is not 
the only reason they warn against overly relying on security, they have ethical reasons for 
restraining as well. In certain instances, it may be more dangerous to avoid ’tacking’ the word 
security on certain issues. The point is, we need to be able to recognize when to connect it or not. 
The following section begins to outline the foundational concepts of the Copenhagen school, 
particularly the concepts of security, referent objects, and threats. 
 
Security, threats, and referent objects. 
Security continues to be a disputed concept, and will likely remain one as long as there 
are divides within security studies more generally.54 For this paper a clearer understanding of 
what constitutes security is necessary, and of what Copenhagen school understands security to 
mean. The following questions provide guidelines for better understanding security: security for 
whom, from whom, in what way and for how long? While exploring these questions, Barry 
Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde explain that we need to remember that there is a 
difference between an international relations invocation of security and the references to security 
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in everyday language.55 Security at its most basic level is about survival and, as a result, the 
particular nature of security threats can be used to justify exceptional measures enacted to address 
the threats. There can never be a universal standard of security based on what threatens human 
life because threats are relative to the referent objects.56 Security is dependent on the actor’s 
understanding of insecurity, and insecurity is dependent on the actor’s ability to manage the 
threats that occur daily.57  
There is an ongoing debate within CSS, and security studies more generally, between 
those who wish to maintain a narrow definition of security threats and those who wish to widen 
the field by accepting the recognition of more non-traditional threats. Taylor Owen discussed 
threats in the context of human security, and he provided critiques that apply more generally to 
security studies. This is reviewed again in chapter six. One of the differences between the 
understandings of Owen and that of Buzan and Waever is that Owen has a more material 
definition of security, while Buzan and Waever have a discursive definition of security. The 
Copenhagen school provides the clarity and focus that is necessary in order to study the issue at 
hand. Their discursive definition is more reflective of how actors engage in security discussions, 
and how they construct threats. As is discussed in more detail below, the Copenhagen school 
does not predefine threats, but does categorize where threats can be identified, according to 
predefined sectors: military, political, societal, economic, and environment.  
What sets the Copenhagen school framework apart from most security studies, is that they 
argue it is “neither politically nor analytically helpful to try to define ‘real security’ outside of the 
world of politics and to teach the actors to understand the term correctly…It is more relevant to 
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grasp the processes and dynamics of securitization.”58 Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde do provide a 
general definition of security, as “the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the 
game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics.”59 Furthermore, 
contrary to the belief of many, the Copenhagen school is not a state-centric framework. It 
recognizes that the state can be and many times is the referent of security, but they clarify that it 
is not the only possible referent.60 Rather than imposing their own restrictions on the referent of 
security, they allow for the case specific recognition of the referent in practice. The Copenhagen 
school clarifies that security issues should be studied within one of the following predefined 
sectors: economic, military, political, social, or environmental. In each of the sectors they outline 
specific areas of potential security relevance.61 They further clarify who the potential referent may 
be within each of these sectors, but again, they do not limit the framework by defining and 
restricting the analyst to specific referents (as is the case with both realism and human security). 
With regards to threats, the Copenhagen school argues that they can be external or internal; the 
threat is dependent on the sector under investigation. The threat does not need to be a real 
objective threat, it only needs to be presented as a threat.62 
Buzan, Waever and de Wilde analyze security issues across different sectors and levels of 
analysis. This allows them more clarity, while expanding and broadening far beyond traditional 
security studies; however, it also narrows and refines the understanding of security in a way that 
human security cannot. In this way, the framework is unique. They explain and identify referent 
objects and threats in the following manner: within the military sector, the referent is usually the 
state, but other political entities can be recognized. They recognize that military affairs are no 
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longer always synonymous with security. “Defense of the state is becoming only one, and 
perhaps not even the main de facto, function of the armed forces.”63 Within the political sector, 
they still recognize the importance of the sovereignty and ideology of the state as the referent. 
However, they clarify that “among the ever more interdependent and institutionalized relations 
characteristic of the West (and increasingly the international system as a whole), a variety of 
supranational referent objects are also becoming important.”64 Within the economic sector, they 
admit that both the referent object and existential threats are difficult to predetermine. To provide 
insight, they explain that “as in the political sector, supranational referent objects from specific 
regimes to the global market itself can be existentially threatened by factors that might undermine 
the rules, norms, and institutions that constitute them.”65 Within the societal sector, they conclude 
that the referent object should be understood as “large-scale collective identities that can function 
independent of the state, such as nations and religions.”66 They elaborate that within this sector it 
is difficult to differentiate between existential and lesser threats, and so whether identities are 
securitized will depend on the understandings of identity that the holders of collective identities 
maintain.67 Finally, within the environmental sector, they explain that the variety of potential 
referents is quite vast, ranging from concrete things to less clear and more large-scale issues. 
They explain that, “at either the macro or micro extreme are some clear cases of existential threat 
(the survival of species, the survival of human civilization) that can be securitized.”68 
Buzan et al. define security issues as being “staged as existential threats to referent objects 
by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules 
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that would otherwise bind."69 They argue that in order to recognize a potential security issue as a 
real and viable threat, it needs to meet the above three “strictly defined criteria that distinguish 
them from the normal run of the merely political.”70 To clarify, the three criteria for successful 
securitization are: existential threats, and emergency measures, that go beyond normal political 
rules. This adherence to specific criteria is one of the main critiques of the Copenhagen process 
of securitization. By following strictly defined and narrow criteria for recognizing threats, new 
and emergent critical issues are unable to be studied as threats, because there are predefined 
sectors under which threats can be identified and guidelines for how actors have to react to the 
potential threat.71  
According to the Copenhagen school, for issues to become questions of security they need 
to be constructed in such a manner; scholars argue that this is done particularly through political 
discourse.72 By engaging in security discourses, actors imbue a heightened priority on particular 
issues. Security is understood as a political discourse that instills responsibility and legitimizes 
the use of power. Furthermore, the securitizing actors are bestowed with the legitimate power 
necessary to engage in the “decisive and otherwise exceptional actions”  and the discourses 
simultaneously bestow a responsibility to engage in the abovementioned actions on those actors 
involved.73  When an issue is understood as a security issue, or as a threat, it takes on political 
saliency and in turn “not only will [the referent] be subject of intense policy activity, but [the 
referent] will also be favorably treated when resources are allocated.”74 In summary, security 
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should be understood as a political discourse that enacts responsibility and legitimizes the 
exercise of power, in order to protect against a threat(s).75 
This Copenhagen school framework is discussed in depth in the ensuing chapter on the 
securitization framework. Before that discussion, the following section demonstrates the 
importance of studying HIV/AIDS, by clarifying how far reaching the virus is and the social, 
political and economic impacts it can have on states and the global system. 
 
 
HIV/AIDS as a Global Security Issue 
 
 
The HIV epidemic has a great capacity to magnify all the social problems of the 
environment in which it occurs.76 (In actual fact it) has adverse effects on all structures 
of society. It is, in fact, the breadth and scope of these effects that make AIDS a threat 
to human security and a potentially destabilizing force worldwide.77  
 
 
 As of 2007, there were approximately 40 million people living with HIV, and to date 
approximately 25 million people have died from AIDS related illnesses.78 It is not just a problem 
of the so-called developing world but the devastating impact is most visible in the poorest and 
least developed regions. What poses to be the most serious issue for the coming decades is that 
regions that previously experienced low prevalence levels are now experiencing noticeable 
increases in HIV prevalence rates (specifically the former Soviet states, and south, southeast, and 
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east Asian countries).79 For this reason in particular, security scholars need to be capable of 
recognizing and understanding HIV/AIDS as a potential security threat either nationally, 
regionally and even globally. In the last decade, national and international responsibility 
regarding HIV/AIDS has become widely debated within both developed and developing nations. 
The complex relations that result from the spread of the pandemic have an impact on  
 
Figure 1: Estimated Global Distribution of HIV/AIDS for 2007 
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more than just the individuals who are infected. In regions such as Africa, where the virus has 
reached epidemic status, all levels of society are negatively affected. The social, political and 
economic spheres are currently being destabilized by death rates alone.  Internationally, the virus 
is garnering unprecedented attention and debate. 
 The connection between HIV/AIDS and security has been argued for many years.80 Dennis 
Altman offers insight into the early efforts that were made to understand HIV/AIDS as a global 
security issue. He claims that there is evidence that as early as the 1990s, individuals within  
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were arguing for the need to understand the impact of 
HIV/AIDS on national and international stability.81 Altman also refers to the Ottawa Charter as 
one of the first examples of an official attempt to establish an international framework to control 
HIV/AIDS.82 Jonathan Mann further influenced the evolution to our current understanding of 
HIV/AIDS. Mann was the first director of the Global Program on AIDS. He made a connection 
between human rights and HIV/AIDS, and from there grew the eventual connection between 
AIDS and development. This latter connection was one of the key motivators behind the decision 
of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC) to establish UNAIDS.83
 While the practical connection between HIV/AIDS and security was made early on by 
those working directly in the field and particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is beyond the scope 
and framework of this study.84 The pinnacle of this attention and debate came when HIV/AIDS 
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was officially recognized and elevated to the level of an international security issue by the United 
Nations. On the 10 January 2000, HIV/AIDS was designated a threat to international peace and 
security in Africa by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).85 The Security Council held a 
daylong meeting discussing the security implications of HIV/AIDS, with a particular but not 
singular focus on Africa. The discussions that took place explicitly discussed the security impacts 
of the virus and the threat beyond Africa if it was left unaddressed.86 This action was not without 
reason. The argument was that conflict, food insecurity, political instability, economic instability 
and the changing of social norms are some of the most complicated and visible outcomes of the 
spread of HIV/AIDS.87 After this point in time, the contentious connection became much more 
widely debated within the practitioner and academic realms. Scholars have discussed, 
encouraged, and discouraged the designation of HIV/AIDS as a security threat and the debate 
continues to this day. The following paragraphs review some of the most visible effects of the 
interaction between HIV/AIDS and the local political and social environment, starting with the 
relationship between conflict and HIV/AIDS. 
Although the full connections between HIV/AIDS, security and the global situation have 
yet to be fully explored, the impact of HIV/AIDS on security has been explicitly made in Africa. 
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The reason for this more intensified focus is that HIV/AIDS has primarily affected Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA). In SSA, the primary cause of death is AIDS and, in some countries, the adult 
prevalence rates are as high as 20-30 percent of the population.88 The high prevalence rates, in 
combination with other long term problems that continue to plague SSA and Africa more than 
any other region, are leading to a complex variety of social, political and economic problems.89  
 
Figure 2: The Ten Sub-Saharan Countries with Highest Adult HIV Prevalence Percentages90 
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Previous attempts to understand the connection between HIV/AIDS and security have been 
problematic because many of those who become infected can live up to ten years or more before 
AIDS actually develops. AIDS impacts their own ability to function in society, and within their 
own lives.91 Due to these temporal considerations, there are long term and short term security 
implications that each have complex dynamics whether individually, nationally, or globally.  
The disastrous long-term effects have become much clearer now, as the virus has had time 
to infect almost three generations of people. It has cycled through and killed at least one full 
generation of people. The short-term versus long-term effects for Africa are each quite different. 
Robert Ostergard has identified the short-term effects as posing the most serious security 
problems for Africa. This temporal dimension is what Ostergard has argued requires the most 
attention. He argues that the threat posed by HIV/AIDS in the short-term is indirect, however this 
is also what makes it a security threat. The impacts are less discernible and can therefore go 
unnoticed until it is too late. For Ostergard it is predominantly the military and political security 
of the African countries that are threatened by the “invisible enemy.”92 Ostergard is referring to 
the dramatic loss of sheer manpower, meaning that the loss of human life will have an immediate 
impact on the ability of states to defend themselves and to effectively run themselves.  
 The relationship between conflict and HIV/AIDS requires further attention because of the 
detrimental outcomes that can result from the interaction between HIV/AIDS and conflict 
situations.  P.W. Singer stresses that the main connection between the two is most visible within 
the military sector. According to Singer, the global infection rates for soldiers are on average 
much higher than the rates of civilians. Within Africa, the rates of infection for the military are as 
much as four times the civilian rates and, during conflict, the rates are estimated to increase up to 
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fifty percent higher than that of the civilian population.93 In African militaries, the reported rates 
of infection remain quite high and for that reason some governments have chosen not to divulge 
their rates of HIV/AIDS infection. The following are estimated HIV/AIDS prevalence rates 
within militaries from 2000: Angola (40-60%), Eritrea (10%), DRC (40-60%), Nigeria (10-20%), 
Tanzania (15-30%), Ivory Coast (10-20%), Lesotho (40%), Malawi (50%), Zimbabwe (55%), 
Botswana (40%), Namibia (33%), Zambia (35%),94 and South Africa (21%).95 With such high 
rates of infection, maintaining the adequate skilled militaries necessary for ensuring national 
security especially poses a major challenge. 
 The prevalence of HIV/AIDS has much wider implications for the affected countries 
beyond the loss of able soldiers. Alex de Waal explains that, “modern institutions are framed 
around decades-long working lives. The running of a bureaucracy such as a government ministry, 
a large firm or an army, depends on staff who have not only professional skills but also many 
years of experience and extensive networks of personal contacts.”96 With such high rates of 
infection, it is inevitable that the core infrastructure of a state will be affected if the infection rates 
become too high. One example of the impact is witnessed in Mozambique. The country is having 
a great deal of difficulty recruiting and training the necessary number of new officers in order to 
fill the positions of those dying of AIDS-related illnesses.97 Experiences like that of Mozambique 
may become more widespread and more visible within the next decade.  
 The risks of increasing prevalence rates of HIV/AIDS during periods of conflict are 
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especially pertinent for security discussions, principally because within the global system there 
are many conflicts occurring. In 2007, there were 328 recognized conflicts occurring 
internationally, which is up from 278 in 2006.98 It is important to note that 198 of the conflicts in 
2007 were identified as non-violent. Non-violent conflict includes strategies to reduce or wage 
political and social turmoil, during which time there can be widespread chaos and instability. 
During non-violent conflict, the reconstruction efforts are not always as prevalent and so the 
resources to test for HIV/AIDS are much less accessible.99 Armed conflicts greatly increase the 
spread of HIV/AIDS, but for regions where the prevalence rates are already high, the virus has a 
particular impact and affect on the nature and the conduct of the war.100 Conflict and HIV/AIDS 
interact negatively in several specific ways. These ways include: first and foremost the systematic 
rape of civilians by the soldiers involved in the conflict on both sides; widespread and 
uncontrollable population movements; the establishment of large refugee camps and the 
conditions created within that foster more widespread rape and unprotected consensual sex; 
poverty, which leads to increased reliance on commercial sex for economic stability; reduction in 
access to information and a decline in literacy; and finally, the devastation of basic but vital 
infrastructure, particularly health care systems.101 Altman points out that the above factors can all 
be clearly identified in various conflicts within the Congo, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and East 
Timor, to name a few.102 
 Peter Piot, the Executive Director of UNAIDS, makes a specific aspect of the relationship 
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quite clear by claiming that, “war is the instrument of AIDS and rape is an instrument of war.”103 
Elbe also explains that the impact of HIV/AIDS is most visible in the manner in which the 
conflicts are waged, especially the use of sexual violence as a so-called weapon of war. Rape has 
been systematically employed during African conflicts in Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, and 
Sierra Leone. During the Rwandan genocide in particular, it has been estimated that upwards of 
500 000 women were raped.104 (The extent of the spread of HIV/AIDS from the Rwandan 
genocidal rapes has yet to be fully determined).  
 The experience of peacekeepers and peacekeeping operations demonstrates the potentially 
devastating interaction between HIV/AIDS and conflict. The United Nations adoption of 
Resolution 1308 in 2000 culminated in international recognition of the implications of HIV/AIDS 
for peacekeeping personnel.  The United Nations “expresses concern at the potential damaging 
impact of HIV/AIDS on the health of international peacekeeping personnel, including support 
personnel.”105 The approach that is being taken by the United Nations Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is not reflective of the security discourses being repeated and 
invoked within the UN. The DPKO has stated that reducing the spread and prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS within peacekeeping operations is a priority for the department.106 However, the 
approach that the DPKO is using involves:   
 (1) The creation of specific capacity within missions for AIDS programmes; (2) 
ensuring the availability of condoms for personnel and observing universal medical 
precautions, including the provision of screened blood supplies and post-exposure 
prophylaxis kits; (3) the development of voluntary counselling and testing capacities 
in missions; (4) establishing monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, like the 2005 
HIV/AIDS knowledge, attitude and practice survey among peacekeepers in Liberia; 
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and (5) developing outreach projects specifically targeting local communities and 
integrating HIV/AIDS concerns into broader mandated activities, such as 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and the training of national police 
forces.107 
 
John Kemoli Sagala further underlines the importance of establishing adequate approaches to 
health and security by highlighting the fact that the military, including peacekeepers, has a 
longstanding relationship with health issues that supports the connection between HIV/AIDS and 
conflict. In particular, Kemoli Sagala argues that the relevance of understanding the relationship 
between the military and its susceptibility to health issues lies in the fact that military populations 
are highly vulnerable to infections, particularly African militaries,108 because of: 
existing socioeconomic and political conditions, the macho nature of their job, the 
mobile tendency of military service, civil wars and other armed conflicts, sexual 
assault of vulnerable populations and refugees, cultural practices and unsterile 
traditional rituals, unsterile health care, tainted blood transfusion, multiple concurrent 
sexual partners, CSWs [commercial sex workers], low condom use, and the presence 
of other STDs such as syphilis and gonorrhea.109 
 
What the DPKO does not take into account, is that conflict enables and hastens the spread of 
HIV/AIDS through many avenues during conflict, including through rape and other forms of 
sexual violence; through soldiers engaging in high risk sexual activity; through peacekeepers 
engaging in high risk activity and spreading it as they are more mobile than the general 
population; through insufficient reconstruction efforts following the conflict; and finally, through 
lack of services and access to HIV/AIDS testing. The above paragraphs have highlighted the 
intrusive and dynamic relationship that can occur between HIV/AIDS and conflict; in particular, 
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they demonstrate the potential security implications that can result from their interactions 
together. 
 The invasive nature of the virus means that areas with epidemic prevalence levels 
experience devastating consequences across all levels of society and the potential security 
implications for HIV/AIDS as a pandemic are even greater. Beyond conflict situations, the social, 
political and economic structures are also inevitably altered and within each of these sectors there 
are more widespread and long-term effects than those witnessed during the times of conflict. In 
all actuality, we have yet to see the full impact of the spread of HIV/AIDS on an affected society. 
A 2006 UNAIDS report identifies that the highly affected countries have yet to experience the 
full extent of the ‘final waves’ of the global pandemic.110  
Another major aspect of security that is impacted by the spread of HIV/AIDS is food 
security, which is especially crucial for any country experiencing instability, and also for those 
that are in the fragile process of development. The food security of countries, especially within 
SSA, is being fundamentally affected by the prevalence of HIV/AIDS. According to the Food 
and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations,   
The impacts of HIV/AIDS on poor rural populations are many and intertwined. The 
impacts can be felt most dramatically in entrenched poverty, food insecurity and 
malnutrition, in the reduction of the labour force, and in the loss of essential 
knowledge that is transmitted from generation to generation… What's more, these 
same consequences of HIV/AIDS - poverty, food insecurity, malnutrition, reduced 
labour force and loss of knowledge - contribute to making the rural poor more 
vulnerable to HIV/AIDS infection. 111 
 
The interactions of the Jaboya system in Lake Victoria further exemplify the above-mentioned 
interactions. The Jaboya system refers to the relationship between the fishermen and the women 
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who purchase the fish from them and it is usually a sexual relationship. A woman who 
participates in this system explained that, “when fishermen come from the lake, I buy their fish, 
but in order to guarantee that you get fish you must also develop a sexual relationship. Without 
sex there is no guarantee that you will get any fish.” These relationships continue as the women 
procure transport to the market, and secure the sale with the market vendors. The Jaboya system, 
is intricately part of the industry and secures access to food for many women; it is viewed as the 
only option for women without any other support. To complete the cycle of the spread of 
HIV/AIDS, the fishermen migrate along the coast with the fish and thus increase the risk of 
further spreading the infection. The Jaboya system demonstrates the severe and vicious circle that 
is created by the relationship between HIV/AIDS and food insecurity.112  
 It has been argued that all levels of security are threatened by the spread of 
HIV/AIDS, including the security of those at the individual, national, and international levels. 
However, each level experiences different outcomes as various aspects of their social, economic, 
and political stability are affected by the spread of HIV/AIDS.113 The complex relationship 
between HIV/AIDS and security continues to be examined by scholars and practitioners alike, 
but to date they have yet to fully address the potential for widespread devastation and the extent 
of the challenge that is faced by the global community. Alex de Waal clarifies what the 
international community is truly facing, as he explains that, “HIV/AIDS is destined to be an 
ineradicable part of the human condition for the next hundred years. Unlike recent historic 
epidemics and wars, which resulted in death for a contained period of time, HIV/AIDS will be 
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akin to the devastation of a war in each and every generation.”114  
 
The United Nations  
  
The United Nations  
 
A review of the role that the United Nations has played in the development of 
international norms is necessary for this study because in general the UN has initiated and 
influenced state acceptance of HIV/AIDS as a security issue. The process of securitization is 
comparable to the normalization of international issues, and thus the influence of the UN as a 
norm advancer is quite relevant to these discussions. 
Since its establishment in 1945, the UN has been pivotal in contributing to the 
development and progression of international relations, particularly by establishing international 
norms and supporting the international acceptance of conventions. The UN is one of the only 
international organizations that has the ability to influence and change the accepted norms of 
states and national actors, at both the national and international levels.115 Its capacity to do so is 
directly related to its international legitimacy and authority as an organization, two qualities that 
very few other international organizations possess together. Its influence is not always openly 
accepted nor is it always recognized, and its abilities are constantly in check with the fact that 
“decision-making in world politics and international organizations remains dominated by 
states.”116  
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As the international organization, the United Nations is the leader in normative 
advancement. The UN is taking on the foremost role in establishing global governance norms. It 
has been bestowed with the role of guardian of  “collective legitimacy,” which in turn allows the 
UN to affect the international standards of state behaviour.117 Actions and reactions from the UN 
have an impact on international cohesion, but more importantly it legitimizes policies and 
stabilizes world order. In doing so, it also establishes and disseminates international norms and 
policies. This legitimation of decisions, values and principles governing international order is one 
of the main functions of the United Nations.118 These connections between authority, power, and 
legitimacy are critical for discussions regarding the ability of the UN to influence norm 
advancement and norm change. As Ramesh Thakur explains, “ideas matter and institutions 
matter as conduits for ideas.”119 Thakur further highlights the potential influence of the UN in 
these matters as he explains that international commissions provide a means of leveraging new 
and contested ideas into “generally accepted global norms.” In other words, “commissions can be 
a catalyst to register norm shifts and convert them into international public policy.”120  
The United Nations is the only international organizations of its kind that has widespread 
international acceptance. The inclusion of most of the international community within the 
organization is one of the most important aspects of the dynamic. From the power, legitimacy 
and authority derived from international acceptance, the UN is imbued with the potential to 
securitize an issue across the international system in the same manner that it is able to diffuse and 
promote various norms internationally. There is no other organization that has the capacity to 
influence across various levels; actors can securitize an issue if they are powerful enough, but 
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only within their own system (a state can securitize a threat to itself, but its attempts to securitize 
a threat within another country, will generally go unrecognized). The UN is an internationally 
recognized organization that is involved in many different systems and to this day, it is relied on 
to provide and advise on matters of national and global importance. 
Thakur acknowledges that norms influence the goals of states and the manner in which 
states pursue their goals, but he also points out that currently there are no sufficient methods for 
conceptualizing a theory of international norms or even for conducting empirical research into 
this area. He offers that the critical question we should focus on is how contested norms become 
institutionalized, both nationally and internationally. As well, we should be studying the 
interactive dynamics of the process of institutionalization.121 Thakur’s work on norms offers an 
additional view for theorizing about securitization in general, and it may offer an additional 
understanding of the process of securitization of HIV/AIDS. If international norms, those brought 
to life within commissions and various organs of the UN, can be transmitted from the 
international level to the national level,122 then it can be supposed that the securitization of 
HIV/AIDS would also occur similarly if initiated by the United Nations.123 Since norms are 
transmitted from the UN down to nations, tracing the same path of institutionalization can test the 
argument that HIV/AIDS is a security issue.  
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The United Nations, Security, and HIV/AIDS      
 
 While there have been other influential organizations, particularly local NGOs, who have 
been actively involved in identifying a connection between HIV/AIDS and security, the focus for 
this paper is the UN and its role in elevating the discussions to the international stage.124 The UN 
has taken several strides forward in reconceptualizing security discussions. The organization has 
helped to shift current security discussions in three identifiable ways: firstly, it has been an 
“incubator and a generator of new ideas.”125 Secondly, it has been a site for debates on security 
and for the formation of new coalitions. Finally, it has been a legitimizing tool, giving weight to 
the human security paradigm in practice.126 The connection within the UN between HIV/AIDS 
and security has its roots in the general evolution of security discussions within the UN. The 
Human Development Report (HDR) is the identifiable moment after which the global language 
and conception of human security was pushed forward, as demonstrated by the following: “the 
world can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives.”127 The HDR was 
only the beginning; there have been other commissions and reports that have further influenced 
the broadening global understanding of security. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
and the Human Security Commission’s 2003 report entitled Human Security Now are two of the 
most visible human security endeavors.128 Two other commissions that have focused specifically 
on HIV/AIDS are: the 2001 General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS, and the Report of 
the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change (which calls for another Security 
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Council session on HIV/AIDS and recommends Security Council cooperation with the World 
Health Organization (WHO)).129 
The United Nations has been closely involved in the development and diffusion of norms 
relating to all three broad understandings of human security (human rights, freedom from fear 
and freedom from want) and it has helped to facilitate state acceptance of these norms.130 The UN 
has historically been involved in the identification of the connection between health and security. 
Starting in 1945, the UN established within Article 55 of the Charter, that: 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are 
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall 
promote: 
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social 
progress and development; 
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and 
international cultural and educational cooperation; and 
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.131 
 
In this article of the Charter, the UN opens the door for more explicit discussions of 
health and security. The UN clearly acknowledges its right to promote solutions for 
international health problems. In admitting this, it must also be capable of identifying 
what those international health problems are. This is an important clarification of the 
role that the UN sees itself playing in the diffusion of norms. The World Health 
Organization, as a branch of the United Nations, openly recognized the link between 
health and security as early as 1946. In the preamble to WHO’s constitution, this link 
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was made explicitly clear: “the health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment 
of peace and security.”132 
The 2000 argument by the UN, that the AIDS pandemic posed a security threat and one of 
severe extent for Africa, laid the groundwork for the argument of broader security issues. It was 
agreed that a broader security agenda had to encompass pandemics from new diseases, as well as 
the reemergence of resistant strains of old diseases.133 The following statement highlights the 
extent of the internalization of HIV/AIDS as a security issue within the UN:  “ a world in which 
every year 11 million children die before their 5th birthday and 3 million people die of AIDS is 
not a secure world.”134 This quote is important for two key reasons. First, the message is clear, 
succinct and thought provoking and it openly connects HIV/AIDS and global security. However, 
the second reason it is powerful is the underlying relevance; Kofi Annan was the face of the 
United Nations, he connected AIDS and security in a simple sentence. This statement has likely 
been quoted and repeated countless times. Norm internalization is not only successful through the 
influence and official acceptance by official organizations; individuals with high levels of 
authority have a great deal of influence on the path of acceptance, whether intentional or not. It is 
argued by the UN that HIV/AIDS can be understood as a human security issue and thus 
identifiable by the UN because of the path that the infection takes: from infection to communal 
devastation and finally to social and national disintegration.135 To break it down further, Thakur 
clarifies that AIDS can be a personal security issue, an economic security issue, a communal 
security issue, a national security issue, and finally an international security issue.136 Ultimately, it 
is clear that there is a gap between current security capabilities and real security needs. In order to 
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begin to redress this gap, the concept of security needs to be more clearly agreed upon and 
security frameworks need to be capable of recognizing instances of security based on the real 
world impacts and recognition of the impacts.  
In moving forward, this paper accepts the role of the United Nations, and the influence 
that the organization itself continues to maintain, as well as the influence of high-level actors 
within the UN. While it is clear that HIV/AIDS as a security issue has become regularly invoked, 
and has historic significance within the United Nations, it is necessary to test whether the 
Copenhagen process of securitization has been successful within the United Nations. This is the 
focus of chapter four. Furthermore, the impact of the UN influence on other states is quite 
relevant to this process, and is therefore connected to its capacity to globally securitize 
HIV/AIDS. For this reason, it is important to briefly review the argument for a connection 
between norms and securitization. The following underscores the connection between norms and 
securitization, in order to further demonstrate how the UN is capable of globally securitizing an 
issue like HIV/AIDS. This also helps to explain why chapter five traces the global process of 
securitization as initiated by the United Nations, within the four governments studies.  
Theoretically, Marco Antonio Vieira makes an important connection between Buzan, 
Waever, and de Wilde’s process of securitization, and international norms. Vieira finds that the 
securitization framework provides an important contribution to the literature on international 
norms. He focuses on how the securitization framework can help to clarify the “constitutive 
dynamics of international security norms;”137 meaning, how norms are formed and become 
accepted and established.  Most importantly, Vieira argues that in the final stage of securitization, 
the threat becomes accepted, internalized, and institutionalized as an international norm.138 
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Vieira’s argument provides clarity and further understanding of how successful securitization 
occurs, and it particularly helps to emphasize the role that the United Nations plays in the current 
process under investigation.  
 Vieira’s connection between international norms and securitization is not alone. As 
discussed in the following chapter, Sjöstedt makes such a connection, and integrates it into her 
own version of securitization. The most relevant aspect of both of these studies is the 
explanations of how norms become internalized; threats are eventually widely accepted and 
institutionalized, and no longer require arguments regarding their security nature.139 The 
connection between securitization and norms is revisited in the final chapter.  
Before beginning the analysis of the extent to which the UN has involved itself in the 
framing of HIV/AIDS as a security issue, the ensuing chapter reviews the theoretical framework 
in greater detail and outlines how this paper studied the securitization of HIV/AIDS and the 
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CHAPTER THREE:  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Copenhagen School Process of Securitization 
     
Securitization 
In its most basic form, securitization is the process of framing an issue as a security 
threat. Securitization is defined by the Copenhagen school as the “process in which the socially 
and politically successful ‘speech act’ of labeling an issue a ‘security threat’ removes it from the 
realm of normal day-to-day politics.”140 The above understanding of securitization that Buzan et 
al. first employed was a step-by-step process. An issue is first presented as an existential threat 
through a securitizing move (a key speech act), made by a securitizing actor (see below), thus 
justifying emergency measures to address it, which in turn calls for actions outside the realm of 
regular political procedure, and ultimately requires an audience acceptance of the issue as a 
security threat.141 Buzan et al. clarify the essential questions for understanding the process of 
securitization, by asking “who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), 
why, with what results, and, not least, under what conditions (i.e. what explains when 
securitization is successful).”142 
 By securitizing an object, it imbues a sense of urgency that only security issues receive 
and in turn demands immediate attention. There are both benefits and pitfalls to securitizing a 
referent object, each are specific to the referent object and the facilitating conditions associated 
with it.  
 Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde further explain that securitization should be understood as an 
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intersubjective process, and not simply as an objective or subjective process. One person alone 
does not decide on the meaning of security, it is understood and agreed upon with the consent and 
acceptance of others.143 Security is therefore developed through the speech acts, and by building 
on understandings of security agreed upon by many. The process does not always have to be a 
one-time event; according to Buzan et al. “securitization can either be ad hoc or 
institutionalized.”144 
 Securitization is considered a step beyond politicization and one that places urgency on the 
recognition and immediate address of the critical issue. Securitization is not only an analytic tool, 
but also a practical tool. This idea is highlighted within the case studies, by tracing the processes 
of securitization. Since Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde agree that “securitization can be studied 
directly; it does not need indicators,”145 this study traces securitization by: identifying the referent 
objects, the securitizing actors, their securitizing moves, the various speech acts, and the success 
of the attempts at securitization. The extent of the securitization is first and foremost 




 The process of securitization requires the identification and articulation of an existential 
threat. The existential threat is an essential component of the Copenhagen process of 
securitization. Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde explain that it essentially refers to the framing of an 
issue as an urgent and direct threat to the existence or the ability of the referent object (see below) 
to continue to function. However, an existential threat can only be understood in context with the 
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referent object as there is no universal standard for what constitutes an existential threat. Buzan et 
al. explain that the “ essential quality of existence will vary greatly across different sectors and 
levels of analysis; therefore, so will the nature of existential threats.”146 They clarify some of the 
restrictions to what constitutes an existential threat by elaborating what is likely to constitute an 
existential threat within each of the sectors.  
In the military sector, they explain that an existential threat is normally understood as a 
threat to the state or its armed forces and the ability of the state to function in its normal 
capacity.147 In the political sector, the existential threat is understood in relation to the 
sovereignty of the state. Sovereignty can be existentially threatened by anything affecting its 
legitimacy and/or authority. In the international arena, anything that undermines the rules, norms, 
and institutions that constitute the regimes within, can be recognized as existentially 
threatening.148 In the economic sector, Buzan et al., explain that existential threats are harder to 
identify. For firms, bankruptcy is most commonly argued as existentially threatening. However, 
for market economies, firms are only expected to last for certain periods of time. Unless the 
survival of the population is threatened, the national economy cannot be identified as existentially 
threatened within. Buzan et al. explain that like the political sector, supranational referent objects 
can in fact be existentially threatened by something that directly affects their rules, norms, or 
institutions.149 In the societal sector, existential threats are even harder to predefine, let alone 
distinguish from lesser threats. In general, the identification of existential threats is dependent 
upon what Buzan et al. call the holder of collective identities and how their identity is 
maintained. Identity and language are generally the only two areas where threats can be 
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recognized as existential in this sector.150 Finally, in the environmental sector, there are some 
clearly identifiable instances of existentially threatened referents, including the survival of 
species, and human civilization; however, as in the economic sector, there are inherent 
difficulties in constructing problems as existentially threatening.151  
 
Securitizing actors 
A securitizing actor is an actor who has the authority and legitimacy to speak security and 
who, therefore, has the ability to present the speech acts to an audience. According to Buzan, 
Waever and de Wilde, securitizing actors are generally high-level political leaders such as 
presidents and prime ministers, but they can also be governments, bureaucracies, lobbyists, 
pressure groups and arguably widely accepted and respected international organizations.152 Buzan 
et al. further explain that some problems can occur when trying to identify the securitizing actor. 
In particular, speech acts do not always openly identify who or what is attempting to securitize 
the threat against the referent object (see below). As a result, they suggest focusing less on who 
attempts to securitize and more on the logic behind the securitization.153 This is taken to mean that 
as an analyst, the actor is important, but studying securitization should not be hindered by 
apprehension regarding who is and who is not an appropriate securitizing actor. The intent behind 
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The referent object of a securitization attempt is easier to discern than the securitizing 
actor. As discussed earlier, traditionally the referent object for security was the state. According 
to the Copenhagen school, in theory, securitizing actors can attempt to establish anything as a 
referent object. They qualify that statement with the fact that in practice, the securitizing actors’ 
attempts are variably influenced by the facilitating conditions (see below), and as a result certain 
attempts to securitize will be more successful than others, depending on the referent object in 
question. Most simply, a referent object is something that can be identified as an object that needs 
to survive.154 The speech-act identifies the referent object as being existentially threatened by a 
specific threat, and thus in need of protection. The general definition of an existential threat is 
self-explanatory, but the exact meaning is only fully understood in the context of the referent 
object. As discussed earlier, there is no universal understanding of security and there can be no 
universal understanding of an existential threat. Buzan et al. further explain that qualities of 
existence differ depending on the referent objects in question, and the sectors under 
examination.155 Buzan et al. explain that analysts should carefully review the discourses to 
establish what the referent objects are. Finally, they note that there are in fact some limits to what 
can and cannot be securitized; security is not entirely subjective. In all actuality, Buzan et al. 
explain that there are “socially defined limits to what can and cannot be securitized.”156 Meaning 
that there are certain issues that will not be accepted by the audience, or that securitizing actors 
will not attempt to securitize because it is socially understood.  
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Functional actors are not always consistently recognized in the process of securitization, 
but they play an important part in the success or failure of the process. Functional actors, as 
Buzan et al. identify them, are actors who “affect the dynamic of a sector.”157 They are neither the 
referent object nor the securitizing actor, but they have an influence on the outcome of the 
process due to their ability to affect the understanding of security within the sector in question.158 
Actors who may fall under this category include those within international organizations and 
especially civil society: interest groups, lobbyists, NGOs, and any other group who would have a 
vested interest in the success or failure of securitization. These are recognizable as actors who do 
not have the authority to securitize but they are actively involved in supporting or preventing the 
securitization attempt. They will be identifiable through their discourses and/or actions.  
 
Securitizing moves 
A securitizing move occurs when something is presented, through discourse (speech act), 
as an existential threat to a referent object.159 Within the Copenhagen school framework, the 
speech act is extremely important for successful securitization. Language and rhetoric frame an 
issue as a security threat; however securitization is not only achieved through directly talking 
security. “[A] successful speech act is a combination of language and society, of both intrinsic 
features of speech and the group that authorizes and recognizes the speech.”160 This can occur 
through the framing language of security used in policies, reports, papers, recommendations and 
speeches. The speech acts are the focus of the research for the analysis portion of this paper; the 
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attention is particularly centered on the resolutions and reports from the United Nations, as well 
as the foreign and national policies of the four chosen governments and speeches by those 
governments.161 Buzan et al. argue that most securitizing moves are attempted at the global level;  
however, most successful instances of securitization occur at the local level.162 This will be 
explored within the case studies, starting at the global level, and reviewing the local state level 
instances of securitization.  
 
Facilitating conditions 
 Buzan et al. explain the importance of facilitating conditions, although they only briefly 
outline the conditions and their role in studying the process of securitization. Identifying 
facilitating conditions can help to provide context and explanation for successful instances of 
securitization. Buzan et al. differentiate the facilitating conditions in direct association with the 
speech-acts. Furthermore, they divide the conditions into two categories: internal conditions to 
the speech-act and external conditions to the speech-act. Internal conditions are related to how the 
speech itself is constructed, the language used and its ability to relate it to security form. External 
conditions are affected by the securitizing actor and the apparent threat. They summarize the 
internal (1) and external conditions (2 and 3) that exist for successful speech-acts as follows:   
1) The demand internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security  
2) The social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitizing 
actor/the relationship between speaker and audience and thereby the likelihood 
of the audience accepting the claims made in a securitizing attempt 
3) Features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitization 163 
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The first condition refers to the construction of the security discourse and the need for a clear 
expression of existential threat, a point of no return, and an option for how to deal with it. As 
well, there will be grammar particular to the sector within which it falls. The second condition 
reiterates the importance of authority, although not necessarily official authority; it refers more so 
to whether they hold enough standing in society to be accepted. Finally, the third condition 
highlights the fact that visible and tangible threats are easier to be securitized if they are clearly 
threatening. If an army tank is visible, it makes a securitizing move easier, in comparison with an 
invisible virus.164  
 
Current Critiques of Securitization and Concerns with Securitizing HIV/AIDS 
 There are several key scholars contributing to the growing body of literature critiquing the 
Copenhagen securitization framework.165 Matt McDonald provides a particularly pertinent review 
and he identifies some of the problems that other scholars have with the framework. In particular, 
McDonald identifies and explores three specific aspects of the process of securitization that he 
finds problematic. First, he explains that the form of act is defined narrowly; specifically he finds 
that the Copenhagen school does not adequately explore other methods of representation beyond 
the discursive speech acts. Second, the context of securitization is too narrow, because it 
highlights the securitizing move as the single most important moment in the process. McDonald 
argues that this misses the construction of security over a period of time and also misses why 
certain issues are securitized and others ignored. Finally, and most problematic for McDonald, 
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the nature of securitization is only understood in its recognition of threats to security, meaning 
that security is only understood through dangers and threats. McDonald explains that this only 
perpetuates the negative and reactive connotations associated with security.166 Some of the most 
relevant issues that McDonald raises are in relation to areas that have been identified as under-
theorized, including: the speech acts themselves, the lack of attention to context of securitization 
and finally threat recognition. Furthermore, he highlights a problem with securitization that is 
discussed in the concluding chapter of this paper, “the securitization framework…is narrow in 
ways that are both analytically and normatively problematic, providing a partial account of the 
construction of security and potentially reifying traditional security discourses and practices in 
the process.”167 McDonald reiterates earlier critiques made by both Ken Booth and Michael 
Williams, arguing that the Copenhagen process of securitization is problematically linked to 
traditional realist understandings of security. Specifically, that the framework maintains too much 
of an unchanging identification of security, bound by specific and strict rules that resonate with 
militaristic action.168 
Another relevant critique comes from Roxanna Sjöstedt, who adds to the ongoing 
securitization discussions by critiquing one of the proclaimed requirements for successful 
securitization: the necessity for a securitizing actor to call for extraordinary measures to be taken 
in order to achieve successful securitization. She finds the above requirement limits the analytic 
and empirical potential for securitization because a decision-maker would only resort to 
bypassing normal political procedures in the most extreme of circumstances. As an alternative, 
Sjöstedt offers the following conceptualization, “here [the securitizing move is] operationalized 
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as the public framing of an issue as a national threat, accompanied be a strategy to act.”169 
Sjöstedt also focuses on the interactions between norms, identities and securitization. She 
clarifies that an important aspect that underlines the primary research for this project is that an 
observable or traceable “discursive change is sufficient to conclude that some form of norm 
internalization has taken place.”170 She argues that a noticeable difference in how the issue is 
discussed, framed and worded, can demonstrate norm acceptance. In this case, that would mean 
that HIV/AIDS is regularly framed as a security issue or threat and that words such as threat, 
fight, and combat are used to describe the approach for addressing it. This requirement is 
important for tracing the influence of the United Nations and for recognition of the extent to 
which states have followed suit.171  
 Colleen O’Manique takes a very critical stance towards securitization and HIV/AIDS, by 
approaching the link between security and HIV/AIDS from a feminist perspective. Her work is 
mostly a theoretical critique and an attempt at theoretical development. She concludes with a 
consideration that highlights an important direction of study. “Critical to any understanding of the 
securitization of HIV/AIDS must be a consideration of how the national and global security 
interests of the dominant powers contribute to the current global “security crisis” of 
HIV/AIDS.”172 This suggestion underlines the importance of discussing these issues and it sets 
the stage for future research directions.  
 Marco Antonio Vieira, Stefan Elbe, Colleen O’Manique, Simon Rushton, and Roxanna 
Sjostedt have all recently written on various aspects of securitization and HIV/AIDS.  They all 
explicitly work under the assumptions that securitization of HIV/AIDS is in fact possible, and 
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that it has already occurred in particular circumstances. Rushton, Vieira, and Elbe173 all focus on 
the larger phenomenon of HIV/AIDS securitization, specifically the international construction 
and identification of HIV/AIDS as a threat. Alternately, Sjöstedt and O’Manique focus on more 
specific and narrow occurrences of HIV/AIDS securitization. Sjöstedt explores securitization 
through a case study of HIV/AIDS securitization in Russia,174 and O’Manique offers a feminist 
understanding of the securitization of HIV/AIDS through a case study of Sub-Saharan Africa.175  
 Rushton, Elbe and Vieira particularly contribute to the ongoing discussion, as they further 
underscore the development and recognition of the international securitization of HIV/AIDS. 
Rushton traces the actual securitization of HIV/AIDS, by focusing on the passing of United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1308 (SC resolution 1308). Rushton explores the validity of 
SC resolution 1308 as evidence of securitization of HIV/AIDS. In particular, he questions the 
content of the resolution, by arguing that the significance of the securitizing actions within the 
resolution may have been overstated.176  
 Through discussions around the ethical dilemma of securitizing HIV/AIDS, Elbe brings an 
important aspect into the debate. He warns of the normative dangers, particularly the diversion of 
national and international responses away from general society and more towards state 
institutions, including the military. The second danger he identifies is the potential of the threat-
defense logic, meaning that states will narrow their responses to that of their own national self-
interest and in turn they will take away from the grassroots organizations that have made crucial 
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forward movement with regards to the social perceptions of the disease.177 Elbe further argues 
that national and international action, towards HIV/AIDS, are likely to be confined to those cases 
where it is only within the actor’s own security interests. To clarify, “States may take action to 
defend their core security interests, but they are unlikely to undertake measures extending much 
beyond these narrow concerns.”178 Numerous international organizations, specifically the United 
Nations, have been making strides forward in uniting states in a global effort to address the 
perceived security threat, while avoiding the potential disregard for the efforts of local grassroots 
movements. In his more recent work, Elbe has also questioned the benefits of framing HIV/AIDS 
as a security issue and instead he argues for a reframing of HIV/AIDS as a global risk.179  
 Finally, like Sjöstedt, Vieira adds to the literature by discussing the securitization of 
HIV/AIDS as a norm. He presents another updated framework for understanding securitization as 
an international norm. Viera’s work further highlights the influence of the UN and the relevance 
of the interaction between the UN and international states. He emphasizes the idea that the 
international understanding of HIV/AIDS has transitioned from that of politicized issue to that of 
securitized issue.180  
As demonstrated above, whether HIV/AIDS poses a security threat to various levels of 
society is increasingly being debated within international system, specifically within international 
organizations and states. Previous strategic studies have identified security either objectively or 
subjectively and in doing so the threat is understood as either real or perceived. Although there is 
no cure for HIV/AIDS, it can be managed, but for many the medicines that are available are too 
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expensive or are not accessible for a variety of other reasons. It could be argued that within 
Canada and many so-called developed and first world countries it is no longer fatal for those with 
access to medical care, meaning that the virus alone can no longer be considered a threat on its 
own. The potential exists to manage the virus effectively and live a life with what could now be 
considered a chronic disease. As a result, within Canada, the overall threat posed has been 
identified as low. However, within developing and third world countries such as Zimbabwe, the 
fatal nature of the virus poses an identifiable individual and national threat, except for the few 
who have the money and access to medicine. Lack of access to medicine, and its fatal nature, in 
interaction with other conditions arguably makes the virus an individual threat but due to the 
increasing pandemic status of the virus, the state itself is increasingly identified as the focus of 
the threat.  
This study situates itself with this group of scholars who are questioning the Copenhagen 
School securitization framework, particularly the stringent requirements for confirming 
successful securitization. This research finds that the strict requirements with regards to the 
articulation of an existential threat, the call for emergency measures, and the requirement for 
action taken outside of the normal political channels prevents the recognition of potential 
instances of securitization. 
These three criteria are revisited in the conclusion, and are the focus of a critique of the 
Copenhagen school process of securitization. This paper incorporates an updated version of the 
criteria into a proposed revised process of securitization, and it concludes that the current process 
of securitization prevents non-traditional security issues from being properly analyzed. To 
summarize, this study aligns itself with scholars such as Roxanna Sjöstedt, who argue that the 
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process is not reflective of how actors engage in the recognition of today's security issues and the 
action they take to address potential threats. 
This research traces the dialogue of the securitizing actors towards specific referent objects. 
The securitizing actor is identified as the United Nations. The referent object in this study is 
Africa, and finally the audience is considered the member states within the United Nations. This 
study will focus on four particular governments, due to the time constraints of this study. The 
research attempts to demonstrate the influence that the securitizing actor, the United Nations, has 
had on the acceptance of HIV/AIDS as a security issue. Although securitization of HIV/AIDS 
remains controversial, and many scholars in the security field argue that it is not possible or it has 
not yet occurred, as demonstrated above there are several scholars who are exploring the concept 
and are contributing to the growing body of securitization literature. The above paragraphs 
reviewed some of their work in an attempt to demonstrate that a foundation has already been 
established for analyzing HIV/AIDS as a security issue.  
 
Purpose and Methodology 
Methodology 
HIV/AIDS is not only framed from a national security perspective, but also a global 
security perspective. This paper traces the securitizing moves and discourse that are occurring 
and being transmitted from the international level to the national level. Regardless of whether the 
securitizing move itself is weak, the aftereffects can be powerful, can build support, transform 
norms and ultimately change the understanding from that of potential security issue to that of a 
recognized security threat. The UN has been framing HIV/AIDS as a security threat from the 
perspective of human security and framing it as a global threat, with the referent objects being 
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specifically Africa but potentially all national states. The Canadian and American governments 
address HIV/AIDS within their foreign policies, from a global and human security perspective. 
The fact that these governments address the epidemic within their foreign policies reflects their 
potential understanding of the virus as a global threat and not as a national security threat. 
However, within the governments of Botswana and Zimbabwe, HIV/AIDS is regularly framed 
from a national security perspective, in national coordination plans and national strategic plans.  
First and foremost, this paper attempted to test the process of securitization, through 
studying how HIV/AIDS is increasingly being argued as security issue. As Barry Buzan et al. 
explained, the best way to study securitization, it to study “discourse and political 
constellations,”181 meaning, to study the language of political organizations or groupings. This 
paper followed their suggestion and focused on the framing language of UN and government 
documents, speeches and policies. This paper applied the Copenhagen process of securitization to 
the United Nations and the four selected governments. In order for successful Copenhagen 
securitization to be confirmed, the following three criterions needed to be present in each case: 
issue presented as an existential threat, a call for emergency action and actual action that is 
beyond normal political measures. If these were not all present then securitization did not 
successfully occur.  There also needed to be a clear demonstration of audience acceptance of the 
argued security issue and this is confirmed through the four government cases, which are in fact 
the audience to the UN global securitization attempt. If they accept the argument, it will be 
visible through internalization of HIV/AIDS as a security issue and action towards addressing it. 
This research relied on content analysis to help review securitizing discourses within the 
United Nations and the four chosen governments. This paper systematically identified when the 
UN and each of the governments implicated HIV/AIDS as a security threat, by analyzing 
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documents for specific security language. The documents did not necessarily need to directly use 
the word security; they also used other words that directly implicate it as a security issue.182 This 
paper selected the following words, after initial reviews of UN documents, in order to trace and 
identify the extent to which HIV/AIDS has been securitized: threat, fight, and combat. These 
words, identified by this paper as security language, on their own do not confirm successful 
securitization but they indicate participation in this process because of their extensive use within 
UN documents and also because of their strong security implications. Since successful 
securitization needs to be confirmed through the call for emergency actions to reduce an 
existential threat that is beyond normal reactive measures, the discourse was essential to review. 
As well, there needed to be an audience acceptance of the framing of HIV/AIDS as a threat. In 
each case, the framing language was reviewed and traced and it was determined through the 
language whether the three key requirements outlined above were present. Finally, it was 
determined whether the countries as the audience, accepted the call for securitization by the UN, 
through the internalization of HIV/AIDS as a security issue.  
The other concurrent method of analysis involved tracing the processes of securitization 
(process tracing). Lene Hansen also describes this type of discourse analysis, as tracing the 
intertextuality. Intertextuality refers to the fact that texts are written with traces of previous texts, 
by referencing past texts. Hansen explains that “a text is simultaneously drawing upon a textual 
past and constructing this past into a unique new text.”183 The paper acknowledges the presence 
of intertextuality: similar language and references to security and HIV/AIDS in the context of a 
security threat.184 This meant tracing the United Nations identification of HIV/AIDS as a security 
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issue and the ensuing policy discourses of the four governments, as reflected within their national 
and foreign policies. To complete the process, and to demonstrate successful securitization, an 
understanding of current action towards reduction of the threat was essential. This process was 
replicated for each government. By specifically focusing on the dialogue and the similar 
discourses between the United Nations and the national governments, the influence of the UN in 
this process was demonstrated. The government references to UN reports and recommendations 
are especially important in demonstrating the influence of these organizations. This 
internalization was determined to be evident if the UN influenced and affected how the 
government policies were developed. To further add to this evidence, anecdotal reviews of 
newspapers from each country case study were done in order to demonstrate a more widespread 
and deeper acceptance of the claim. This review also highlighted the roles of facilitating actors in 
the audience acceptance of the security claim.  
As mentioned above, the documents that were analyzed were all coded for what has been 
called security language (threat, fight, combat) and the results are collected in tables, with word 
frequencies noted. (The security language is not synonymous with securitization). These are 
found in the appendices section at the end of the paper. All of the frequencies and coded 
documents for the United Nations are collected in Appendix 2, Appendix 3 contains those for 
Canada, Appendix 4 contains those for the United States, Appendix 5 contains those for 
Botswana, and finally Appendix 6 contains those for Zimbabwe. For the majority of the cases, 
only security language that was in direct reference to HIV/AIDS, identified through 
concordances, was tabulated.185 In the rare cases that security language not referring to HIV/AIDS 
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was included within the tables, it is noted in text. The coding software used for the study was the 
YoshiKoder, a downloadable content analysis software program, developed by Harvard 
University’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs.186 It was used in order to determine 
the frequency of the selected security language and it also collected the concordances, which 
showed the context in which the security language was being used.  
 
Justification of Case Selection 
 The following paragraphs review the country selections, why they were chosen and how 
they attempt to clarify whether the securitization of HIV/AIDS is possible and/or occurring. The 
UN has almost single handedly promoted the acceptance of human security within the practical 
world of states and other IOs. The 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report 
first brought widespread recognition of this concept187 and within this framework the UN has 
been able to raise concern and awareness of the global security threat that HIV/AIDS poses. For 
these reasons, as well as other factors that are discussed in depth within the paper, the UN was 
identified as the initial starting point for a Copenhagen securitization of HIV/AIDS.188 
The two sets of comparisons are different in that Canada and the United States only 
discuss HIV/AIDS as a security issue within their foreign policies. Within government policies 
and departments, HIV/AIDS is framed as a security issue from an international perspective. Yet 
within Botswana and Zimbabwe, HIV/AIDS is understood as a national health concern and a 
health priority. Accessing Canadian and American policy documents was not an issue. They are 
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all available on both government websites and they are chronologically maintained. The problem 
that occurred when trying to review the government documents that addressed HIV/AIDS within 
both Botswana and Zimbabwe was access. It was quite difficult to gain access to primary 
documents that addressed any official HIV/AIDS policies. Due to the ongoing work with the UN, 
these governments are required to submit annual AIDS reports through their national AIDS 
programs. Through these programs, presidential speeches and other reports, it was possible to 
gain insight into both government perspectives. Speeches provide first hand access to how these 
governments understand HIV/AIDS, just as well, if not better than the official documents. 
The first two governments, Canada and the US, were selected due to the fact that they are 
western countries not currently experiencing an epidemic. Within Canada there is open access to 
information, especially with regards to the necessary foreign policy documents. Most 
importantly, Canada has a close link to the human security framework. The Canadian 
Government website has a section devoted entirely to human security, so their positions and 
efforts are clearly identifiable.189 With regards to the United States, as a major world power and 
an influential government, the extent to which they have securitized HIV/AIDS is very relevant. 
As well, the US approach to HIV/AIDS as a security issue is particularly pertinent in their 
foreign policy because of their foreign involvement in conflict situations. They were also selected 
because of their relationship with the United Nations and thus it was assumed that they would 
likely share more similar viewpoints concerning issues of security. 
The two African countries were selected not to compare with the Canadian and American 
perspectives, but to compare and contrast with each other.  Botswana proves to be an interesting 
case because in 2001 it had the highest prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS at 38%, while in 2005 it 
                                                 




dropped to 24%, and currently it is sitting at around 23.9%.190 The Botswana government presents 
itself as being actively involved in tackling the high rates of HIV/AIDS, and with the stability of 
the political system, it was assumed that the drop in rates could be attributed to government 
attention. As a result, how the government approaches and frames HIV/AIDS is extremely 
pertinent.191 Zimbabwe also proved to have high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates. In 2001, the 
prevalence rates were approximately 33.7%, whereas in 2005 the rates had dropped to 20.1%, 
and the current estimates have dropped dramatically to 15.3%.192 The same reasons that Botswana 
was selected apply to the reasoning for Zimbabwe’s inclusion. Decreases of these proportions 
may demonstrate a change in governmental approach or policy towards HIV/AIDS. For 
Zimbabwe, other influences may be responsible for the dramatic reduction in prevalence rates. 
Zimbabwe is different from Botswana in that it has not had a stable political or social system for 
quite some time. For this reason, it was decided that these two countries would provide an 
important glimpse into how African governments are framing and then addressing HIV/AIDS. 
These case studies are not meant to be representative and they are not meant to provide 
generalizations. They are intended to demonstrate whether the process of securitization has 
trickled down from the UN, to various governments, and thus influencing national and foreign 
policy decisions. By following the process of securitization, it should confirm the influence of the 
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Areas of Uncertainty 
The coding program, the Yoshikoder, cannot automatically code for the selected security 
words while at the same time filtering to ensure that the frequencies include only security 
language associated with HIV/AIDS. This is a problem with the coding program, and it requires 
manual checks done using separately identified concurrences to identify the proximity of the 
security language with HIV/AIDS. As a result, there may be a few frequencies in which the 
numbers do not reflect direct correlations between HIV/AIDS and security language. This is 
attributable to human error, but for this study, it should not change the results. There were 
enough documents reviewed in order to demonstrate regular and widespread references to 
HIV/AIDS as a security issue.     
Another area of uncertainty exists with regards to the intentions of the UN and the four 
governments. It could be argued that the United Nations and the governments were not 
intentionally securitizing HIV/AIDS or furthermore that they did not want to do so. This paper 
finds that whether this is true or not does not change how they have framed HIV/AIDS within the 
national and international discourses. If anything, it is important to review these issues to show 
the importance and implications of securitization and that it can occur whether intentionally or 
not. Language should be carefully chosen because it can have unintended meanings and affect 
how things are understood and therefore addressed. 
It is important to review some of the limitations of this paper that result from the research 
methods. First and foremost, the research is essentially based on secondary and publicly available 
government documents. Primary research was not conducted; this was particularly due to the 
limitations with regards to traveling to Africa. As a result, the author's understanding of the two 
African case studies is particularly limited in this way. 
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It is also necessary to recognize the limitations of this study as a result of partial 
information. While this study draws on the tradition of discourse analysis, it limits itself to the 
study of a set of written documents and essentially conducts an in depth content analysis of these 
documents. This choice of analysis is what the Copenhagen school does in their initial work; they 
focus on the speech acts themselves, analyzing for direct articulations of security threats. It is 
recognized that the reliance on direct speech acts has garnered many criticisms and arguments for 
moving beyond strict reliance on direct speeches. These critiques are particularly argued by 
McSweeney and Williams, and are discussed in detail in the previous section on critiques of the 
Copenhagen school. 
Furthermore, the study is restricted by the statist ontology, as it relies on our acceptance of 
the key actors in global security to be states: as individual national states, and collectively as the 
United Nations. This study follows the inclinations of the Copenhagen School, and even though 
their framework does allow for a broader investigation, the focus remains ultimately on states and 
has not addressed other actors involved in the process. 
Finally, this study is further limited in its comparisons and its strict reliance on official 
documentation. First, the author relies on the reader's acceptance of the validity of her 
comparisons and second, the author has not included extensive research on HIV/AIDS in general 














 The United Nations has played the most significant role in the international promotion of 
HIV/AIDS as a security issue, as a result, the UN is identified here as the securitizing actor. This 
paper argues that there are two separate securitizing moves and therefore two attempts at 
securitization that the UN has initiated. The move that is internationally understood to be the 
securitizing move is the passing by the Security Council of Resolution 1308. However, it is 
argued here that the meeting on January 10th, “The situation in Africa: the impact of AIDS on 
peace and security in Africa,” should be understood as the internal securitizing move, and the 
passing of Resolution 1308 as the moment when HIV/AIDS was accepted by the internal 
audience (members of the UNSC) and thus securitized. 
 In the build up to Resolution 1308, this paper argues that the meeting held on January 10th 
2000 has now proved to be a more influential moment than the day the resolution itself was 
passed. The United Nations Security Council held daylong sessions, on the 10th of January 2000, 
for the discussion of HIV/AIDS as a security issue. The agenda was entitled “The situation in 
Africa: The impact of AIDS on peace and security in Africa.”193 The discussions that took place 
were unlike any other top level HIV/AIDS debates that had taken place in the past; the 
participants were high-level representatives of various countries and organizations. In addition to 
the fourteen member states that were present, the following countries requested and were granted 
access to participate in the discussions: Algeria, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cape Verde, Croatia, 
                                                 
193 The United Nations Security Council, "S/Pv.4087," in The Situation in Africa: The Impact of AIDS on Peace and 
Security in Africa (New York: 2000). 
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Cuba, Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, 
the Libyan Arab, Jamahiriya, Mongolia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, the Republic 
of Korea, Senegal, South Africa, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Also granted access to the 
days proceedings were Mr. James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank; Mr. Mark Malloch 
Brown, Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme; and Dr. Peter Piot, 
Executive Director of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS.194 The president of the 
Security Council at the time, and United States representative, Mr. Al Gore, opened the 
meeting.195  
 It was at this meeting that the precedent was set, and this meeting should be considered the 
internal securitizing move for a United Nations securitization of HIV/AIDS. It was the first time 
in the history of the Security Council that a health issue was discussed in the context of a security 
threat. The following statements made by Vice-President Al Gore illuminate the general 
discourse and sentiment of the arguments that were made. Mr. Gore openly admitted that they 
were meeting on that day to discuss “a brand-new definition of world security,”196 and that “there 
are new forces that now or soon will challenge the international order, raising issues of peace and 
war. It (is) time to change the nature of the ‘way we live together on this planet.’ From this 
vantage point ‘we must forge and follow a new agenda for world security.’”197 Mr. Kofi Annan 
picked up where Mr. Gore left off and attempted to narrow the debate by declaring that “nowhere 
else has AIDS yet become a threat to economic, social and political stability on the scale that it 
now is in Southern and Eastern Africa. The impact of AIDS in that region is no less destructive 
                                                 
194 The role that these men played during the meeting, and the role in particular that Dr. Peter Piot played in the 
larger scheme of the securitization of HIV/AIDS, leaves them to be identified as facilitating actors.  
195 Council, "S/Pv.4087." 
196 Ibid., 2. 
197 United Nations “Security Council Holds Debate on Impact of AIDS on Peace and Security in Africa,” Security 




than that of warfare itself.”198 These were powerful statements, made by powerful men, within 
what many recognize as one of the most powerful international organizations. The impact and 
symbolic support that reverberated from this meeting have invariably influenced how 
governments are now approaching and recognizing HIV/AIDS within Africa, and globally.  
Over the course of the meeting itself, HIV/AIDS was frequently discussed and argued to 
be an urgent and immediate threat to the stability and security of Africa, and there were calls for 
immediate attention.199 The meeting heard over forty high level speakers present, and it lasted for 
a total of seven hours. The official recognition of HIV/AIDS as a threat to the peace and security 
of Africa was undeniable. Many took these discussions home to begin framing their own state 
level approaches; this is identifiable through the increase in frequency of security language within 
the four reviewed governments. 
During the months prior to the passing of Resolution 1308, there were several other 
meetings within the Security Council which further internalized the consensus of HIV/AIDS as a 
security issue. Following a meeting on the 13th of January 2000, a presidential statement by 
Richard Holbrooke further acknowledged the importance of HIV/AIDS in the security 
discussions.200 As well, during the 31 January 2000 SC meeting, the threat and relevance of 
HIV/AIDS was again discussed.201 The meeting on the 9th of March 2000 was important because 
it was followed with another presidential statement that explicitly “encourages the UN to 
                                                 
198 Ibid., 4. 
199 The United Nations Security Council, "S/Pv.4087," in The Situation in Africa: The Impact of AIDS on Peace and 
Security in Africa (New York: 2000). 
200 United Nations “Security Council, Following Briefing by High Commissioner for Refugees, Calls for Increased 
Resources to Meet Africa’s Substantial Needs,” Security Council Press Release, SC/6783, 4089th meeting, January 
13th, 2000. Accessed online, March 19th, at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/scact2000.htm  
201 United Nations “ ‘Month of Africa’ Dispels Idea that African Problems Are Secondary, United States Says to 
Final January Security Council Meeting,” Security Council Press Release, SC/6796, 4096th meeting, January 31, 
2000. Accessed online, March 19th, at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/scact2000.htm  
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sensitize peacekeeping personnel in the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS.”202 The April 19th 
meeting resulted in the adoption of Resolution 1296, which focused on civilians in armed 
conflict, and included a section detailing the importance of making peacekeepers aware of the 
threat of HIV/AIDS.203 These discussions all contributed to the final adoption of Resolution 
1308.204 Because the Security Council facilitated and hosted the initial meeting and those that 
followed, it validated and contributed to the increased acceptance of the arguments put forth 
during the January 10th meeting.  
 The Security Council Resolution 1308 that was later passed was much more reserved and 
focused than the discussions that preceded it. As a resolution, it provides very little substance or 
support for action; it is most powerful in its symbolic nature. There is no explicit use of security 
language in connection with HIV/AIDS and Resolution 1308 refrains from ever referring to 
HIV/AIDS as a security issue.205 It does provide a faint connection to the discussions on January 
10th by “stressing that the HIV/AIDS pandemic, if unchecked, may pose a risk to stability and 
security.”206 Whose security and stability is not discussed, and this leaves the potential to widen 
the discussions from simply that of Africa, to a more global context. In general, it maintains 
traditional HIV/AIDS language by describing HIV/AIDS as a pandemic and crisis. As well, it 
remains further restrained by stating that the UNSC is ‘deeply concerned’ as opposed to being 
threatened and urging for attention. 
                                                 
202 United Nations “Inadequate Financing Could Undermine Efforts to Ease Human Suffering, Says Security Council 
in Presidential Statement,” Security Council Press Release, SC/6820, 4110th meeting, March 9th, 2000, 2. Accessed 
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203 See section 19, Resolution 1296. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1296, adopted by the Security 
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 Comparing the meeting on the 10th of January to the finalized SC Resolution 1308, there is 
a dramatic difference and it becomes quite clear how reserved the resolution actually is; so much 
so that it is of little practical value. The difference is clear in the language and the open 
discussions of the security implication during the January 10th meeting. At the meeting Kofi 
Annan was also quoted as saying that, “the fight against AIDS in Africa was an immediate 
priority and must be part and parcel of the international community’s work for peace and security 
on the continent.”207 Many other high level experts spoke on the security implications of 
HIV/AIDS. Referring back to Al Gore, who further “recognized the real and present danger to 
world security posed by the AIDS pandemic” and elaborated that “the threat of AIDS was real for 
all people and every nation. Borders could not keep it out. AIDS was a global aggressor that must 
be defeated.”208 One of the most poignant excerpts came from Mark Malloch Brown, who was the 
administrator for UNDP and Chairman of UNDP, as he “congratulated Richard Holbrooke, 
Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, for the vision to go beyond 
the old definitions and bring to the table a discussion of the world’s most dangerous 
insurgency.”209 The resolution is ultimately focused on peacekeeping operations and simply 
suggests establishing several practices for preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS by and within 
peacekeeping forces.210 
 While the stark difference between the resolution and the meeting is clear, the difference is 
likely due to social constraints and the unlikelihood of the resolution being passed if it contained 
the same language that was expressed during the meeting. Again, the influence of this resolution 
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ultimately lies in the action taken by the Security Council and not so much in what it resolved.211 
Thus, the international understanding of Resolution 1308 as the defining moment where 
HIV/AIDS becomes framed as a security issue is in many ways unjustified, because it was 
actually the January 10th meeting that laid the groundwork. It is instead the very act of the UNSC 
passing the resolution that imbues HIV/AIDS with an unstated sense of security awareness. It is 
especially for this reason that it is later argued that the Copenhagen process of securitization is 
inadequate for studying this issue.  
 The passing of Resolution 1308, by the United Nations Security Council can also be 
considered as a reaction to the January 10th meeting and it is argued here that the adoption of the 
resolution fulfils the three main criterions for securitization: HIV/AIDS is presented as an 
existential threat (a stretch, but within the meeting, HIV/AIDS was identified as a direct threat to 
the security and stability of Africa. Within the political sector, Buzan et al recognize that regimes 
can be existentially threatened by situations that undermine the rules, norms and institutions that 
constitute those regimes)212, there was a call for emergency action (present and clearly argued), 
and action beyond normal political measures (also present, and confirmed by the meeting itself, 
and the passing of the historic Resolution 1308). Finally, the passing of the resolution also 
confirmed internal audience acceptance, with the audience being members of the Security 
Council involved in passing the resolution.  
 The ensuing chapters review how successful the move for a global (external) securitization 
has been.213 The UN, and many representative actors, have already presented HIV/AIDS as an 
existential threat to Africa. Within Resolution 1308, the UN argued for what should be 
                                                 
211 Note in Appendix 2, the vast difference in the prevalence of the language. In its most basic form, securitization is 
about discourse, and those who involve themselves in it.  
212 Buzan et. al., 22.  
213 See Appendix 1 for the full resolution. 
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considered extreme measures, which were beyond normal political (United Nations) procedure. 
Specifically, the Security Council explained that it was “deeply concerned by the extent of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic worldwide, and by the severity of the crisis in Africa in particular”.214  As a 
result, within the resolution they engaged in what could be called groundbreaking 
recommendations surrounding how member states should begin to address the issue within their 
own peacekeeping troops. The following excerpt demonstrates the extent of the Security Council 
recommendations:  
Encourages interested Member States to increase international  
cooperation among their relevant national bodies to assist with the creation and  
execution of policies for HIV/AIDS prevention, voluntary and confidential testing  
and counselling, and treatment for personnel to be deployed in international  
peacekeeping operations.215 
   
 The referent object that is most clearly argued is Africa, when the Security Council 
explains that it is “Deeply concerned by the extent of the HIV/AIDS pandemic worldwide, and 
by the severity of the crisis in Africa in particular.”216 Furthermore, the threat is to the stability 
and maintenance of peace and security. However, there are underlying references to a more 
global security threat. To ensure conceptual clarity, and in order to test securitization most 
effectively, the main referent object that is identified is Africa, the epicenter of the pandemic. 
However, when the framing language and security discourse within the United Nations and the 
four selected case studies connects HIV/AIDS and global security, it is also identified. These 
references indicate a more generalized global securitization of HIV/AIDS. Within the resolution, 
the Security Council recognizes global pandemic when it stresses:  
the need for coordinated efforts of all relevant United Nations  
                                                 
214 "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1308." edited by United Nations Security Council: United Nations, 
July 2000. 
215 Ibid., 2.  
216 Ibid., 1.  
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organizations to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic in line with their respective  
mandates and to assist, wherever possible, in global efforts against the pandemic.217 
 
 Beyond Resolution 1308, there were other facilitating conditions that variably affected the 
acceptance of the attempts to securitize HIV/AIDS. Later Security Council resolutions and 
meetings helped to further internalize the connection between HIV/AIDS and security and 
contribute to the extent of the external securitizing move, as various UN members attended the 
meetings. The include: SC Resolution 1296 (19 April 2000); SC Resolution 1318 (7 September 
2000); SC Resolution 1325; SC meeting 4259 (19 January 2001); SC meeting 4288 (7 March 
2001); SC meeting 4339 (28 June 2001); SC meeting 4859 (17 November 2003); SC meeting 
4970 (17 May 2004); and SC meeting 5228 (18 July 2005).218 Between 2000 and 2005, the 
connection between HIV/AIDS and security became widely accepted within the UN, particularly 
within main organs of both the Security Council and the General Assembly. The willingness of 
the Security Council, in particular, to partake in the original discussions is symbolic of the larger 
role that the UN is playing in the expansion of the global understanding of HIV/AIDS and 
security, particularly in the securitization of HIV/AIDS within Africa.219   
 
Success of HIV/AIDS Securitization Attempts 
 After reviewing a wide range of UN documents, starting with those of the Security Council, 
the General Assembly and finally UNAIDS, a pattern has emerged.220 The research began by 
focusing on all Security Council meetings and resolutions that addressed HIV/AIDS in general. 
                                                 
217 “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1308,” 1.  
218 See Appendix 2 for the entire collection of UN documents that were reviewed for this study.  
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Malaria and other diseases.” "Millennium Development Goals,"  http://www.undp.org/mdg/basics.shtml. 
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Official resolutions and minutes from meetings were reviewed in an attempt to identify an 
increase in references to HIV/AIDS as security issue, as well an increased sense of obligation. 
Notably, the importance and influence of UNAIDS remains present throughout both the meetings 
and resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. UNAIDS provides a common 
thread that unites the discussions. Through a review of the rest of the UN documents, it is clear 
that HIV/AIDS is regularly addressed by the Security Council and security language is 
continually used to frame HIV/AIDS as a security issue.221 In order to identify how the UN 
framed HIV/AIDS, the documents were coded for security related words.222 The security 
language was chosen because their use frames HIV/AIDS as a security issue by employing war 
related language. As well, by framing it in such a way, it necessitates a group effort to address it. 
Meaning that one person does not address a threat, an army does. This was especially important 
when reviewing UN documents. The discussions of HIV/AIDS within these documents also 
explicitly called for a joint international front to stop the virus, i.e. the global fight. 
 From 2000 through 2003, there was a dramatic increase in the number of United Nations 
meetings and resolutions that address HIV/AIDS and an equally dramatic increase in the 
frequency of security language in those documents. After 2003, the frequency drops off, but not 
entirely. This is demonstrated through the chart containing the security language coding 
frequencies of UN documents, in Appendix 2. The connection between HIV/AIDS and security 
remained within most UN documents that were reviewed. From the UNSC’s sessions on 
HIV/AIDS in 2000, to the 2001 United Nations Millennium Development Goals, to UN General 
Assembly’s Special Session on HIV/AIDS (UNGASS) in 2001, to the follow ups to UNGASS in 
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2003, there was a great deal of attention focused on the global AIDS epidemic during those three 
years. The gained momentum from 2000 and 2001 pushed on until 2003, after which the 
attention did not disappear, but instead leveled off. This reduction could be explained as the result 
of widespread acceptance of the argued threat and an internalization of HIV/AIDS as a security 
issue. In other words, the urgency within the UN seemed to dissipate, as it became clearer that the 
epidemic was only increasing and was not going to recede. Within the UN after 2003, annual 
reports continued and follow-ups to the UNGASS were regularly revisited. To date, the security 
language has not disappeared; it has only reduced with the lessening of intensive attention given 
to the AIDS epidemic. As such, it has arguably become internalized and the connection is now 
commonplace within the UN. To supplement discourse analysis, increases in HIV/AIDS funding 
are used to demonstrate a commitment to HIV/AIDS.  
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As demonstrated above, there is a definite increase in AIDS funding between 2000 and 2002. 
This increase in AIDS funding highlights how the global understanding the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
changed after that period of time. This is further reviewed within each country case study, by 
tracing national annual spending on HIV/AIDS to help supplement the discourse analysis. It is 
interesting to note that the flurry of meetings, documents and arguments towards the severity of 
the threat posed by HIV/AIDS slows down around 2003, yet funding only continues to increase 
after that period of time. This underscores the argument that HIV/AIDS as a security issue 
became widely accepted within the UN and that it then became the focus of efforts to reduce the 
threat, most easily done through funding efforts.  
 While the security discourse has demonstrated that the United Nations participated in the 
framing of HIV/AIDS as a security issue, successful Copenhagen securitization requires the 
existence of more than just internalized security discourse. As discussed earlier, in the case of the 
United Nations, the three key requirements have all been met in the case of the internal 
securitization: presenting the issue as an existential threat, justifying emergency measures and 
requiring action beyond normal political procedure. The fact that the Security Council allowed 
for the discussion of HIV/AIDS as a security issue for Africa meets a stretched version of 
existential threat, this requirement is applicable to both the internal and external attempts at 
securitization. However, with regards to the external attempt to securitize HIV/AIDS, the other 
two requirements have clearly not been met. The UN has not argued for emergency measures to 
be put in place and it has not gone beyond normal organizational procedures and argued for states 
to react in such a manner. It has only required that states submit annual UNGASS reports, other 
than that, it has only made recommendations for urgent (but not emergency) measures that fall 
within normal political and UN procedures. 
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 The following chapter continues to trace the process of securitization, as initiated by the 
United Nations, by reviewing how the audience (states) accept and react to the claim of the global 
security threat of HIV/AIDS. In order to demonstrate this, there is in depth discourse analysis of 
the audience’s (states) acceptance, internalization and use of security language when discussing 





































CHAPTER FIVE: GOVERNMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES ON HIV/AIDS 
 
In order to test the global securitization of HIV/AIDS as initiated by the United Nations, 
two western countries, Canada and the United States, were chosen to test the securitization of 
HIV/AIDS and to provide clarification of how they identified HIV/AIDS within the international 
system. They were selected because of their relationship with the United Nations and thus it was 
assumed that they would likely share more similar viewpoints concerning issues of security. As 
well, Canada and the United States have differing approaches to foreign policy and it was 
important to see how each approached and framed the issue of HIV/AIDS within the global 
system.  On their own, they each approach the issue differently; however, with the influence of 
the UN they have more similar understandings of HIV/AIDS and security. Through studying the 
foreign policies of Canada and the US with regards to HIV/AIDS, it begins to demonstrate the 
extent of the success of the global attempt to securitize HIV/AIDS, as initiated by the United 
Nations.   
Through a similar review of two African countries, Zimbabwe and Botswana, it becomes 
clear that they have also followed suit. These two countries were identified for their proximity to 
the epidemic centre, and because in comparison with other SSA countries, they had two of the 
highest rates of HIV/AIDS in 2001, and two of the largest reductions in HIV/AIDS prevalence 
rates since 2001.224 There are several possible reasons for this reduction and it was not possible to 
extensively analyze why such reductions occurred; however at the very least it was assumed that 
in order to occur it was necessary to have some form of governmental cooperation. As a result, 
Botswana and Zimbabwe would have governments who are at least recognizing HIV/AIDS as a 
problem, and making efforts to address it as such. Their approaches to HIV/AIDS reduction and 
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how they frame HIV/AIDS within their policies are important for this study. They are not 
considered representative, but begin to provide clarity on how far securitization has reached 
within the global system.  
 




 Canada is considered part of the global north, a developed country that is actively 
involved in the global community. It has an estimated population of 32,876,000 and a GDP per 
capita of US$ 39004 as of 2006.225 Canada is not experiencing the epidemic-like spread of 
HIV/AIDS that is occurring elsewhere in the world; but it is still a pressing national issue and a 
recognized national problem that the government is addressing. As of 2005, approximately 
58,000 Canadians were living with HIV/AIDS, and a total of 13,300 Canadians had died of 
AIDS.226 In other words, approximately 0.18% of the Canadian population is living with 
HIV/AIDS. In light of the nature of the virus and the global impact, the Canadian government has 
been increasing its involvement in addressing HIV/AIDS both nationally and internationally.  
Nationally, the government established the Federal Initiative to Address HIV/AIDS in 
Canada, in 2005. The Federal Initiative links together the Public Health Agency of Canada 
(PHAC), Health Canada, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research and finally the Correctional 
Service of Canada.227 National spending on HIV/AIDS has remained steadily the same, even 
though the number of programs funded by the government has increased. Between 1994 and 
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1998, the Canadian government budget allocation for domestic HIV/AIDS spending was $42.2 
million. When the Canadian Strategy on HIV/AIDS (CSHA) replaced the National AIDS 
Strategy in 1998, the budget allocated to the CSHA for the period of 1998-2008, was still $42.2 
million.228  
Internationally, Canada has been more readily increasing its monetary involvement in 
addressing the epidemic. The exact statistics are difficult to track due to the multitude of 
departments involved in the distribution of international aid. The main departments that are 
currently involved include: the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), 
the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the Federal Initiative (which 
includes Public Health Canada, Public Health Agency of Canada, Health Canada, the Canadian 
Institutes of Health Research and the Correctional Services of Canada). Cumulative annual 
statistics on total amounts spent on Global AIDS support are unavailable; however from a review 
of the various organizations involved, it is clear that following 2000/2001, a notable increase in 
funding occurred.  
The Canadian government has been regularly increasing its international budget for global 
HIV/AIDS spending. In 1998, before the widespread recognition of the global crisis posed by 
HIV/AIDS, the Canadian government spent approximately US$ 14.8 million on global AIDS 
support.229 By 2001, it had committed US$ 270 million, to be spread out over the following five 
years.230 In 2005 it again increased its committed funds, to approximately US$ 515 million, to be 
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distributed between 2005 and 2007.231 In between 2000 and 2007, there were various amounts of 
funds promised and spent on the global AIDS crisis. The exact amount is difficult to track, 
because beyond the lump sums committed by the government for a period of several years, there 
were annual commitments made, such as in 2004, when Canada committed funds to the World 
Health Organization for the 3 by 5 initiative. As well, in 2005, it also increased its commitment to 
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund). CIDA has estimated, 
between 2000 and 2005, Canada committed a total of over US$ 800 million.232 Most recently, 
Canada announced a pledge of US$ 450 million to the Global Fund over the next three years 
(2008-2010).233 It is important to also note that there is a difference, sometimes dramatic, in 
commitments versus actual spending. It is clear that there is more tracking and research needed 
into this aspect of Canada’s international HIV/AIDS involvement. The above-outlined Canadian 
financial commitments to the global AIDS crisis have demonstrated Canada’s increasing 
awareness of the problem at hand. Regardless of the exact amounts spent, the increases in 
international spending demonstrate a dramatic change in how the health problem was recognized 
and addressed by the government. The following section further details how the Canadian 
government participated in the securitization of HIV/AIDS, by examining specific government 
documents and discourses.  
 
Process of Attempted Securitization of HIV/AIDS 
 
As discussed above, the Canadian government has several government departments that 
have an input on how HIV/AIDS is addressed. As a result, many departments and other 
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organizations are involved in formulating the Canadian perspective on HIV/AIDS and security. 
This departmental delegation proved to be a challenge and an issue in maintaining consistency 
while collecting data. However, through an extensive review of Canadian government reports, 
bills, meetings and, particularly, reports from the Canadian International Development Agency, 
between 2000 and 2008, it is clear that there is a regular and arguably an ingrained connection 
between HIV/AIDS and security. As such, the Canadian perspective on HIV/AIDS within the 
international system has become clearer.234   
Various linkages between security language (identified in this research as either: threat, 
combat, or fight) and HIV/AIDS are consistently employed within these official documents. 
HIV/AIDS is regularly framed as a threat and thus as an opponent that can be subdued. From 
2000 to 2003, the framing of HIV/AIDS with security language existed and became slowly more 
prevalent. In 2002, CIDA released their report “CIDA Takes Action Against HIV/AIDS Around 
the World.”235 In the report, CIDA clarifies its role in the Canadian framing of HIV/AIDS when it 
explicitly outlines that, “fighting HIV/AIDS is an important part of the work of the Canadian 
International Development Agency.”236 The report also explains that, “CIDA’s programs are 
making a difference in the fight against HIV/AIDS.”237 The majority of the report does discuss 
HIV/AIDS in the context of a pandemic and the other health related outcomes. However, by 
referring to the fight against HIV/AIDS, several issues are conveyed to the audience, whether 
intentionally or not. First and foremost, it elevates HIV/AIDS beyond that of a serious health 
issue, such as cancer, to something more ominous and rallying. It also imbues the virus with a 
                                                 
234 After contacting the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, I was forwarded onto CIDA, who 
then forwarded me to their website. From this, it was assumed that the official views of the Canadian government on 
HIV/AIDS and foreign policy are represented within the CIDA documents.  
235 CIDA, "Cida Takes Action against HIV/AIDS around the World,"  (2002). 
236 Ibid. Message from the Minister. 
237 Ibid., 2.  
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sense of purposeful intent, one that can be addressed, punished and subdued. It then becomes 
more of a security issue, and less of a health issue. Secondly, by referring to the fight against 
HIV/AIDS, it also references a more global initiative. Within Canada there is not a pandemic and 
there is not such a level of urgency surrounding the spread of HIV/AIDS. In turn, it becomes 
clear that the so-called fight against HIV/AIDS is occurring elsewhere and that Canada is joining 
an ongoing initiative (arguably this references the UN establishment and recognition of 
HIV/AIDS as a security issue). 
  In 2003, the Canadian government published a report from the Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “HIV/AIDS and the Humanitarian Catastrophe in Sub-
Saharan Africa.”238 This report delves not only into the issue of HIV/AIDS, but also the 
concurrent crises that affect the spread of HIV/AIDS. The report contains numerous references to 
the Canadian approach to HIV/AIDS as a security issue, repeatedly framing it in the context of a 
war against HIV/AIDS. The report claims “failure to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic will leave 
many countries in a condition of structural famine and structural economic problems that will 
make development all but impossible.”239 By discussing HIV/AIDS in this manner, not only is the 
spread of the virus connected to security, but also it is argued that by not combating HIV/AIDS, 
the stability and development of the affected countries is threatened. This takes the attempt to 
securitize HIV/AIDS a step further and provides even greater pressure to address the spread of 
the virus in a security manner. Throughout the report there are numerous references to the fight 
against HIV/AIDS and the need to combat HIV/AIDS. The following excerpt further 
demonstrates how the committee understands and frames the virus within Canadian foreign 
policy:  
                                                 
238 FAIT, "HIV/AIDS and the Humanitarian Catastrophe in Sub-Saharan Africa.," in Report of the Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (2003). 
239 Ibid., 18.  
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The Sub-Committee believes that concerted and well-funded international action to 
combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic is urgently needed, and that Canada can and should 
make a real difference in this global effort. This effort must involve all stakeholders, 
but rich countries in particular are called on to mobilize the financial resources that are 
urgently needed to fight the HIV/AIDS pandemic.240 
 
 From 2004 onwards, HIV/AIDS continued to be regularly framed as a security issue within 
reports, bills and sessions, with the exception of 2006. The only report that was reviewed for 
2006 was a “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Canada and the 
Melinda Gates Foundation.”241 This contained none of the security language the research coded 
for. As well, within the government bills and sessions that were analyzed from 2006, there was 
very little security language used. There were only two occurrences of threat language (and these 
were not actually referring directly to HIV/AIDS),242 which is noticeably reduced from the 
previous years as well as all reports, bills and meetings from ensuing years. The year 2006 seems 
to be anomalous; perhaps it has to do with the lack of government attention directed to 
HIV/AIDS during that year. In Appendix 3, Canadian government reports have been separately 
organized from government bills and meetings, in order to demonstrate the differences between 
reports and official bills and sessions. It was assumed that reports would have more freedom to 
frame HIV/AIDS as a security issue.  
 Ultimately, as is demonstrated through the chart in Appendix 3, the connection between 
HIV/AIDS and security is clearly internalized within Canadian foreign policy and is still actively 
used within the Canadian government. The phrase fight against HIV/AIDS has become 
somewhat of a slogan and is widely applied to describe to the action that the government is 
undertaking in order to address the global spread of HIV/AIDS. This action is most clearly 
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identified through monetary support and contributions, as demonstrated in the previous section. It 
seems clear that the process of securitization, as initiated by the United Nations, is accepted and 
is occurring within the Canadian government, to the extent of the continuation of the speech acts. 
The Canadian government in this case is the audience and has successfully internalized the 
concept as a security issue; is now not only accepting it, but also attempting to address the 
international threat posed by HIV/AIDS, first and foremost through large financial contributions.  
 As far as confirming the Copenhagen process of securitization, it cannot be proclaimed as 
successful. The three key components that need to occur, have not, and will not occur with 
regards to the global securitization of HIV/AIDS as accepted by Canada. In order for an issue to 
be recognized as a security threat, there needs to be: an existential threat; demonstration of 
emergency measures taken to address the threat; and action taken to conduct the emergency 
measures that is beyond normal reactive measures. While the UN framed HIV/AIDS as an 
existential threat within Africa, it has not argued successfully for the other two criteria. As well, 
Canada has not demonstrated an attempt to participate in the promotion of the UN prompted 
securitization; none of the three criteria are argued within any of the reviewed documents.  
 
Facilitating Actors 
 The above section has focused on the Canadian government’s acceptance of the United 
Nations argument that HIV/AIDS is a security issue, both within Africa and globally. However, 
there are other Canadian actors that have played a role in how the Canadian government 
understands HIV/AIDS. These facilitating actors have helped to form and solidify the Canadian 
understanding of HIV/AIDS as a security issue. It is beyond the scope of this paper to trace every 
possible facilitating actor involved. As a result, it recognizes the more general role of civil society 
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actors in the securitization of HIV/AIDS. The most involved facilitating actors are HIV/AIDS 
organizations, specifically international NGOs, and IOs. Canadian newspapers, specifically The 
Globe and Mail, have also played a role, as they have continued to discuss the concept of 
HIV/AIDS as a security threat.  
UNAIDS243 and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria have explicitly 
argued for support in the global fight against HIV/AIDS and have particularly been relied on by 
the Canadian government for information on the global state of the AIDS pandemic. Throughout 
the discourse analysis of Canadian documents and speeches, these organizations have been 
repeatedly mentioned. Their information and statistics have also been relied on to keep the 
Canadian government up to date on the global AIDS rates and the necessary requirements to 
address the virus. Other Canadian NGOs are actively involved in tackling HIV/AIDS 
internationally and they have regular contact with the Canadian government, invariably 
influencing the government’s opinion of HIV/AIDS as a global issue. These organizations are 
generally viewed as experts in their field; as a result, how they frame and discuss HIV/AIDS is 
taken seriously and inevitably affects how Canada perceives the issue.  
 The extent of Canadian newspapers’ role in the securitization of HIV/AIDS is also beyond 
the confines of this paper, but a general review of how HIV/AIDS has been framed since 2000 
reveals how the Canadian understanding of HIV/AIDS has also evolved and changed. Through a 
general review of articles published in The Globe and Mail, between 2000 and 2008, it is clear 
that HIV/AIDS security language existed within some articles that were published even in 2000, 
however it was very infrequent. Generally, most articles that were published during 2000 and 
                                                 
243 While UNAIDS is a United Nations organization, it has markedly different views from that of the main 
organization. UNAIDS is focused entirely on HIV/AIDS, and it openly discusses HIV/AIDS in the context of a 
global security issue. The organization was involved in the original meetings in 2000, suggesting that some of their 
views are different than the main organ of the United Nations. As a result, its influence here is recognized as more of 
a facilitating actor in the securitization of HIV/AIDS.  
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2001 that contained HIV/AIDS references were focused on other topics, and HIV/AIDS was 
mentioned in passing. Through a general archives search between January 1, 2000 and January 1, 
2001, there were fifty-eight results for articles that contain the words HIV/AIDS.244 The headings 
were focused on AIDS drugs and medical technologies, AIDS education, and even Aboriginal 
AIDS rates. The focus was more Canadian, although there were several articles that discussed the 
state of the AIDS epidemic in Africa, and a few articles reviewed the UN meetings that were held 
during that year. In 2000, there was only one article that hinted towards AIDS as a security issue, 
with the heading of “Plan fights AIDS crisis.”245 The general number of articles written about 
HIV/AIDS steadily increased after 2000: from January 2001-2002 there were 78 articles 
published; January 2002-2003, 91 articles; January 2003-2004, 140 articles; January 2004-2005, 
133 articles; January 2005-2006, 121 articles; January 2006-2007, 200+ articles; January 2007-
2008, 152 articles; and finally, between January 2008-2009, 180 articles published.246 Each year, 
the issues addressed in the articles became more international, more focused on the global 
epidemic and more focused on the role of the UN. Increasingly, there were more and more 
references to the ‘AIDS war’ and to the ‘global fight against HIV/AIDS.’ What this demonstrates 
is the parallel role that civil society plays alongside the government in the process of 
securitization. In essence, the newspaper helped the argument about HIV/AIDS as a security 
issue to transcend the governmental structures and to become instilled within general society. In 
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turn, as it becomes more widely recognized within general society, there is more pressure placed 
on the government to pay attention and take action.  
 
Success of Securitization Attempt 
 The Copenhagen process of securitization requires an issue to be designated as an 
existential threat in order to be recognized as successful. HIV/AIDS does not itself pose an 
existential threat to Canada and it has not been argued to be one. There is more of an argument 
for the global implications of HIV/AIDS spreading as a global pandemic; however, that still 
stretches the existential threat requirement and has not been successfully argued. As a result, the 
first requirement has not been met. The second requirement of emergency measures has also not 
occurred. While Canada is financially and supportively participating in the international effort to 
reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS, nothing that can be identified as emergency measures have been 
taken. The Canadian approach is quite in keeping with the actions of many other countries 
committed to reducing the spread of HIV/AIDS and they are not much different than the actions 
that would be taken for other prevalent diseases or international crises. The third requirement, 
that action taken is beyond normal reactive measures or beyond normal political procedures, has 
also been left unmet. There have been no instances of the Canadian government or government 
actors reacting to the spread of HIV/AIDS by sidestepping normal political procedure. This is the 







United States and HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue 
 
Background Information 
 The United States, like Canada, is part of the global north. It is regarded as one of the 
most influential and powerful countries in the world. Its support and involvement in issues of 
global concern is both expected and greatly sought after. As a result, how it approaches the global 
HIV/AIDS crisis, both nationally and internationally, is quite relevant. The United States has 
both the human and monetary resources to engage effectively in the global initiative to address 
the virus. As of 2006, the US population was estimated to be 305,826,000 with an estimated GDP 
per capita of US$ 43562.247 With regards to the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, the United States has 
almost two times the number of people living with the virus than Canada; as of 2003, 
approximately 1,112,000 people were living with HIV.248 In other words, over 0.36 % of the 
American population is living with HIV/AIDS.  
 The United States has separate national and international programs that oversee the US 
approach to addressing the HIV/AIDS crisis. Nationally, the United States addresses the issue of 
HIV/AIDS mainly through the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). However, national spending is divided 
between care and assistance, research, and prevention. Therefore the budget is allocated to a wide 
variety of organizations. National spending has increased, from approximately US$ 9.6 billion in 
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1999 to US$13.9 billion in 2002.249 By 2009, the Federal-funding request for national HIV/AIDS, 
has reached US$18.2 billion dollars.250  
For the American international approach to the global HIV/AIDS epidemic, the United 
States government established The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in 
2003, prior to which United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was 
responsible for the US global approach to HIV/AIDS.251 The American budget for international 
HIV/AIDS spending is much greater than the Canadian budget and it has remained quite high 
since before 2001. This likely has to do with the early recognition of the so-called nation threat 
posed by the virus in 2000, when the Clinton administration officially declared the global AIDS 
epidemic to be a national security issue for the United States.252  
According to PEPFAR, the United States has spent a great deal on the global epidemic 
over the years, as is demonstrated by the following estimated annual spending: 2001, $840 
million; 2002, $1.2 billion; 2003, $1.5 billion; 2004, $2.3 billion; 2005, $2.7 billion; 2006, $3.3 
billion; 2007, $4.5 billion; and in 2008, $6.0 billion.253 However, there is a noticeable increase in 
US global HIV/AIDS funding even before the establishment of PEPFAR, when USAID was still 
responsible for HIV/AIDS funding. Between 2000 and 2001, there is leap in USAID funding for 
global AIDS support. In 2000, just under US$200 million was spent by UNAIDS, however, by 
2001 the amount had increased by about seventy five percent, to just under US$350 million 
dollars. This was a dramatic and marked increase in global AIDS funding, because between 1993 
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and 1998, funding had remained relatively stable at approximately US$125 million.254 The United 
States has a much clearer record of its funding for HIV/AIDS than Canada and this is likely a 
result of the singular departmental delegation. Before PEPFAR took responsibility for the US 
global approach to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, USAID was similarly efficient in its records of 
spending. USAID can provide records of its global HIV/AIDS funding back to 1986 when it 
spent $0, to the period between 1987-1992 when it increased from US$0 to approximately 
US$100 million and to the final amount of around US$325 million distributed in 2002.255 The 
above outlined changes in global HIV/AIDS spending demonstrate a clear change in approach 
and understanding of the impact of the virus for the United States. The reason and extent of the 
change is explored in more depth through the following detailed review of American documents 
and discourses.  
 
Process of Attempted Securitization of HIV/AIDS 
 
The American foreign policy on HIV/AIDS was much more readily available compared 
to the Canadian policy. The United States has a relatively new department devoted to addressing 
the global issue of HIV/AIDS. The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) 
was established in 2003 and has been actively involved in promoting the global fight against 
HIV/AIDS.256 Most recently, at the October 21st 2008 US White House Summit on International 
Development, President George Bush reiterated the purpose and role of PEPFAR. In his address 
to those who attended the White House Summit, President Bush explained that “[Liberian 
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President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf] talked about our fight against HIV/AIDS. And it's a noble battle 
and it's a necessary battle. In 2003, as she had mentioned, we launched PEPFAR. The program is 
the largest commitment by any nation to combat a single disease in human history.”257 This quite 
clearly situates the American perspective on HIV/AIDS and reiterates the global approach that 
the American government takes in addressing HIV/AIDS. It openly frames HIV/AIDS in security 
language and whether intentionally or not, it presents the virus as a threat that can be fought and 
subdued. Ultimately, it is not framed as an existential threat. 
 Through a review of American reports from PEPFAR, the United States Agency for 
International Development, as well as government bills and meetings from 2000 through 2008, a 
clearer understanding of the American framing of HIV/AIDS has emerged. Again, the research 
began with the year 2000 because of the attention the UN focused on HIV/AIDS following the 
January 10th meeting as well as with the passing of Resolution 1308. Since PEPFAR was not 
established until 2003, there is a slight gap for reports between 2000 and 2003; however USAID 
helps to provide insight into how the United States framed HIV/AIDS during that period of time.  
The 2001 USAID report “Leading the Way: USAID Responds to HIV/AIDS,”258 begins 
demonstrating the potential top down influence of the United Nations and the increasing 
acceptance of the UN framing of HIV/AIDS as a security issue. This USAID report writes, that 
“[2000 was] the first time that HIV/AIDS was discussed as a global security threat at such a high 
level. The Security Council repeated its warning in July…In September, the international 
community again stressed the need for and commitment to a coordinated attack on HIV/AIDS.”259 
This shows the US recognition of repeated attempts by the UN to prompt the so-called 
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international community to follow suit and join together in a global effort to combat HIV/AIDS, 
or to join the fight against HIV/AIDS. It is clear that the UN framing of HIV/AIDS as a security 
issue did not go unnoticed, and within Canada and the United States (at the very least) it seems 
that it was not challenged but was readily accepted.  
An interesting phenomenon that is identifiable (see Appendix 4) starting in 2005, with the 
first PEPFAR report to congress, is a steady increase in security language until 2008, when it 
drops dramatically. The reports from 2005, 2006 and 2007 each had extremely high frequencies 
of security language used to frame HIV/AIDS. The 2005 report repeatedly uses the exact phrase, 
fight against HIV/AIDS, 27 times and refers to it in various other combinations throughout the 
report, including repeatedly using phrases such as the global HIV/AIDS fight, to combat 
HIV/AIDS, or combating HIV/AIDS. These same sentences are found in the following two reports 
from 2006 and 2007. In the 2006 report, the fight against HIV/AIDS was referred to 29 times, and 
in various other combinations. In the 2007 report, it was referred to 39 times, as well as numerous 
other combinations totaling 91 references to fight, fights or fighting. The frequency of this 
language cannot be interpreted as accidental. The United States openly accepts and seemingly 
goes beyond to promote the UN conception of HIV/AIDS as a security issue. HIV/AIDS is 
framed in the reports as an enemy, and by invoking it in such a way action is deemed necessary.   
 The frequency of the language in the reports varies from the frequency of the language used 
in government bills and meetings, but the security language does not disappear. As Appendix 4 
demonstrates, the threat language is much more reduced within the acts of Congress and the bills 
and meetings reviewed from 2000 through 2008. In part, this is because some of the bills and acts 
reviewed did not directly deal with HIV/AIDS, unlike the reports, which were solely focused on 
HIV/AIDS. As well, unlike the reports, the resolutions and bills are drafted very specifically, 
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briefly and directly. Ultimately, when HIV/AIDS was discussed in resolutions and bills, it was 
framed in a similar manner to the reports. In 2000, in the “World Bank AIDS Marshall Plan Trust 
Fund Act,”260 the phrases to combat HIV/AIDS and to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS were used 
to discuss the action needed to address HIV/AIDS.261 In the “Global AIDS Research and Relief 
Act of 2001,” (Introduced in Senate on June 28th)262 HIV/AIDS was framed as a threat, and the 
phrase to combat(ing) HIV/AIDS was repeatedly used. Furthermore, in 2002, in the “United 
States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2002,”263 the preference 
to employ security language when discussing the approach to addressing HIV/AIDS continued, 
as to combat HIV/AIDS is repeatedly employed. This continues in the reports reviewed for 2003 
through 2008.264 Like Canada, the United States uses security language to refer to the global 
epidemic but does not employ the same language when discussing HIV/AIDS in a national 
context.  
 It is necessary to address the spike in frequency of security language for 2008. The “Tom 
Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, 
and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008”265 is an act “that was passed to authorize 
appropriations for fiscal years 2009 through 2013 to provide assistance to foreign countries to 
combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, and for other purposes.”266 The increased frequency 
in security language in the act is partially due to the fact that the security language is now 
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engrained in American foreign policy with regards to HIV/AIDS. The purpose of the act is 
explained: “to strengthen and enhance United States global leadership and the effectiveness of the 
United States response to the HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria pandemics and other related 
and preventable infectious diseases in developing countries.”267 The act goes on to elaborate 
section by section the American strategy and the American effort to address the global AIDS 
pandemic. This act explicitly describes how the American effort is focused on combating 
HIV/AIDS. It also goes further and expands its focus to tuberculosis and malaria, and describes 
initiatives to combat malaria and to combat tuberculosis.268 (This is an interesting expansion 
beyond HIV/AIDS, moving to include other diseases as threats. This is an important step beyond 
the original intent of the United Nations. However, this is beyond the scope of the research). This 
act clearly demonstrates how, by 2008, HIV/AIDS is fully accepted as a security issue by the 
United States and is being addressed and managed as such.  
 To build upon this conclusion, the United States it the largest monetary contributor to the 
so-called fight against HIV/AIDS. PEPFAR is one of the largest individual contributors to global 
HIV/AIDS expenditures. As of 2006, it accounted for 21% of the global funding to HIV/AIDS 
activities.269 In addition to PEPFAR’s contributions, as is demonstrated in the chart below, the 
United States is one of the largest, if not the largest single contributor to the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. In reviewing the global acceptance of HIV/AIDS as a security 
issue, the establishment and influence of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and 
Malaria in 2002 requires review. The very mandate of this organization is to increase resources 
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to dramatically increase the fight against these three diseases.270 This confirms that the United 
States has successfully internalized the critical threat posed by HIV/AIDS, as initiated by the 
United Nations. The United States should be understood as another member of the audience in 
this case, and it could be further argued that they have gone above and beyond the role of the 
audience and are now demonstrating their own plan of action, through their monetary 
commitments, and are further promoting the securitization of HIV/AIDS through their frequent 
and extensive security rhetoric.  
Figure 4: Pledges and Contributions to the Global Fund 
 
Source: The Global Fund Progress Update, April 14th, 2008.271 
 
Facilitating Actors 
 In general, the same conclusions that were drawn about Canadian facilitating actors apply 
to the United States case. American civil society plays an understated but influential role in the 
securitization of HIV/AIDS. However, first and foremost, it is clear that the US has played a 
considerable role as a facilitating actor in the global securitization of HIV/AIDS. The US has 
been extremely vocal in proclaiming the need to address the HIV/AIDS epidemic. American 
                                                 
270 The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. Available online, at: 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/about/how/ 




representatives played an important role as advocators for the initial January 2000 Security 
Council meetings on the issue of HIV/AIDS and they have continued to be quite vocal in their 
argument of HIV/AIDS as a national and global security issue. Since the United States 
involvement in the January 2000 Security Council meetings, their interest seems to have only 
gained momentum from that point onward. The United States has openly argued for the need to 
join together to address the threat of HIV/AIDS. Some of the most influential individuals include 
Al Gore, and Richard Holbrooke who played key roles in the lead up to the January 2000 SC 
meeting, as well as both the Clinton and Bush Administrations who openly declared HIV/AIDS a 
national security threat. In public the slogan the global fight against HIV/AIDS, has been 
repeatedly invoked by countless American government representatives, particularly in the 
national arena. The United States has the financial capacity, a vested interest, and the influence to 
partake in the international promotion of HIV/AIDS as a security threat. As a result, it is one of 
the most important facilitating actors in the global securitization of HIV/AIDS. 
 With regards to the role of civil society as facilitating actors for the American acceptance of 
HIV/AIDS as a security issue, both American newspapers and NGOs play diminished roles in 
comparison to that of the government. With regards to newspapers, it seems that they play a 
different role in the United States than in Canada. The New York Times was reviewed in the 
same way the Canadian Globe and Mail was reviewed. An annual search for articles containing 
the words HIV/AIDS was undertaken, between 2000 and 2008, searching for headings that used 
security language in connection with HIV/AIDS. With regards to content and frequency of 
HIV/AIDS discussions, The New York Times is quite different than The Globe and Mail. The 
New York Times maintains a more national focus and very infrequently discussed HIV/AIDS in 
general, let alone in the context of security. The fight against HIV/AIDS was mentioned in a 
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heading on June 1, 2001: “After Meeting, Asia-Pacific Health Ministers Vow to Fight AIDS.”272 
It was only explicitly mentioned one other time, on August 30, 2005, when the heading explained 
that, “U.S. Blamed for Condom Shortage in Fighting AIDS in Uganda.”273 There were no 
significant annual increases in frequency of the words HIV/AIDS, if anything the frequency 
decreased. Between January 1, 2000 and 2001, there were 10 articles published; January 1, 2001-
2002, 7 articles; January 1, 2002-2003, 9 articles; January 2003-2004, 12 articles; January 2004-
2005, 6 articles; January 2005-2006, 4 articles; January 2006-2007, 5 articles; January 2007-
2008, 13 articles; and finally between January 2008-2009, 2 articles.274   
 With regards to NGOs and IOs, the same conclusions drawn in the Canadian case apply. 
The influence of organizations such as UNAIDS and the Global Fund are still important, as they 
are relied upon by the American government for key statistic information, and therefore, how 
they frame HIV/AIDS is also taken seriously. Ultimately, the role of the US government as a 
facilitating actor, with regards to monetary support, precedes the potential influence of such 
organizations. Since the United States government itself has been at the forefront of HIV/AIDS 
securitization efforts, any outside efforts to persuade the US either for or against the 
securitization of HIV/AIDS would likely be moot.  
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Success of Securitization Attempt 
 Even though there is successful internalization of HIV/AIDS as a security issue and active 
involvement in internationally promoting HIV/AIDS as a security threat, this does not mean that 
there is a successful case of securitization. Ultimately, the same conclusions that were drawn in 
the Canadian case study apply the case of the United States. While the UN framed HIV/AIDS as 
an existential threat within Africa, it has not argued successfully for the other two criteria. While 
the United States has demonstrated an interest in promoting HIV/AIDS as a security issue none 
of the three criteria are argued successfully within any of the reviewed discourses.  According to 
the Copenhagen process of securitization, HIV/AIDS has not been framed as an existential threat. 
Furthermore, extreme measures have not been established and no action has been taken to 















Botswana and HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue 
 
Background Information 
Politically, Botswana continues to remain a fairly stable, democratic and peaceful African 
country. In 2007, Botswana’s population was estimated to be 1,882,000. 275 Until recently, it was 
presided over by President Festus Mogae, who retired from office in 2008. Socially, the outlook 
is not necessarily as positive. The government has been trying to reduce poverty, increase 
employment and reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS. Poverty reduction is being negatively affected 
by the slow employment rates and increasing numbers of unemployed university graduates. 
Furthermore, the spread of HIV/AIDS is affecting the government’s efforts to reduce poverty, as 
the virus reduces the ability of those who are infected to work, it also gradually reduces their 
savings and finally it creates new groups of vulnerable individuals as others become infected.276 
Economically, in the past Botswana was recognized as one of the fastest growing economies in 
Africa. However, in the past couple of years its economic growth has been noticeably slowing. 
As of 2006, its GDP per capita was approximately US$ 4755.0.277 The recent reduction in 
economic growth is due mainly to the unpredictable nature of the diamond mining sector which, 
for Botswana, is a major force affecting the economy.278 Current economic boosts are due to 
government investment in mining, power generation, and irrigation.279  
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According to the 2008 UNGASS Progress Report from Botswana, the country’s HIV 
prevalence rates increased slightly from between 270 000 and 290 000 adults and children living 
with HIV in 2001, to between 280 000 and 310 000 adults and children living with HIV in 
2007.280 The HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in 2001 was estimated to be 26.5% of the population, and 
by 2005 it was estimated to have dropped to 24%.281 In 2007, adult HIV prevalence rates were 
estimated to have declined to approximately 23.9% of the adult population aged 15-49.282 The 
government further estimates that as of 2007, approximately 113,000 people had advanced stages 
of HIV infection.283  
According to Botswana’s UNGASS Progress Report, HIV/AIDS funding has been 
steadily growing. In order to address the spread of HIV/AIDS within the country, the government 
has been increasing spending to address the epidemic: in 2002, US$ 69.8 million was dispersed 
nationally;284 in 2003, it remained the same at US$ 69.8 million; in 2005, it jumped to US$ 165 
million; and finally in 2007, it was slightly reduced to US$ 148.6 million.285 What is deceptive 
about these numbers is that they include both domestic and international donor aid, but regardless 
of the uncertain nature of the funding, the numbers do clearly demonstrate increased attention and 
                                                 
280 Government of Botswana. “2008 Progress Report of the National Response to the UNGASS Declaration of 
Commitment on HIV/AIDS,” Ministry of State President, National AIDS Coordinating Agency (2008), 5. Accessed 
online at: http://www.unaids.org/en/CountryResponses/Countries/botswana.asp  
281 UNAIDS"AIDS Epidemic Update: December 2007." In Executive Summary. (Geneva, 2007), 11. 
282 Government of Botswana. “2008 Progress Report of the National Response to the UNGASS Declaration of 
Commitment on HIV/AIDS,” Ministry of State President, National AIDS Coordinating Agency (2008), 5. Accessed 
online at: http://www.unaids.org/en/CountryResponses/Countries/botswana.asp  
283 Government of Botswana. “2008 Progress Report of the National Response to the UNGASS Declaration of 
Commitment on HIV/AIDS,” Ministry of State President, National AIDS Coordinating Agency (2008), 9. Accessed 
online at: http://www.unaids.org/en/CountryResponses/Countries/botswana.asp 
284 Government of Botswana. “Status of the 2002 National Response to the UNGASS Declaration of Commitment on 
HIV/AIDS,” Ministry of State President, National AIDS Coordinating Agency (2003), 11. Accessed online at: 
http://search.unaids.org/results.aspx?o=html&q=cty$bot&c=publications&s=true&i=false&p=1&&d=en&l=en  
285 Government of Botswana. “2008 Progress Report of the National Response to the UNGASS Declaration of 
Commitment on HIV/AIDS,” Ministry of State President, National AIDS Coordinating Agency (2008), 7. Accessed 
online at: http://www.unaids.org/en/CountryResponses/Countries/botswana.asp 
 
 103
funding appropriated to the issue. The following chart differentiates between recent domestic and 
international funding. 
Figure 5:  Botswana Resource Tracking by UNAIDS286 
   
 
Although it continues to have one of the highest HIV/AIDS rates in the world, Botswana 
is now proving to be a fairly good case of successful HIV/AIDS reduction. Between 2000 and 
2007, it has shown a steady decrease in prevalence rates and the government has been front and 
center in the effort to address HIV/AIDS within the country.287 Former President Festus Mogae 
was especially committed and involved in the effort. One of his most noted attempts to increase 
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Accessed online at: http://www.unaids.org/en/CountryResponses/Countries/botswana.asp 
287 See Figure 2, page 29. 
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public awareness and to reduce stigma was when he took a public HIV test.288 Recently, in 
October 2008, Former President Mogae received an award recognizing his leadership on 
HIV/AIDS; he won the Mo Ibrahim Annual Award for Good Governance.289 For these reasons, 
Botswana was selected as a case study to contrast with the ensuing review of Zimbabwe. How 
these very different governments approach HIV/AIDS within their own countries and whether 
they address the global pandemic as a security issue, is quite pertinent in tracing the extent of 
global securitization of HIV/AIDS.  
   
Process of Attempted Securitization of HIV/AIDS 
 
While the Botswana government does not explicitly frame HIV/AIDS as a national 
security issue, on its National AIDS Coordination Agency (NACA) webpage, it openly explains 
that the Coordination involves “the identification of key strategic priorities in the war on 
HIV/AIDS, the development and support of programs and policies that can deliver on these 
priorities, and the development of tools and mechanisms to monitor and evaluate progress in the 
war on HIV/AIDS.”290 The government does not provide open access to its policies and 
approaches to HIV/AIDS. Those that are accessible are divided between the government 
Department of Health and the National AIDS Coordination Agency. In order to gain a better 
perspective on how the Government of Botswana frames HIV/AIDS, presidential speeches were 
supplemented with government reports and reports from the NACA.291  
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Unlike the Canadian and American governments, there were no speeches collected for 
Botswana prior to 2003 and the earliest document that reflected government perspectives on 
HIV/AIDS was the “NACA Status of the 2002 National Response to the UNGASS Declaration 
of Commitment on HIV/AIDS.”292  The phrase fight against HIV/AIDS was repeatedly used in the 
report and it repeatedly discussed strategies to combat HIV/AIDS. This understanding of 
HIV/AIDS was unexpected because it was originally thought that African governments would 
actively avoid framing HIV/AIDS as a security issue because of the potential negative affects. 
Although the security language, particularly fight against HIV/AIDS, is not employed to the same 
extent that the Canadian and American governments frame their policies, it is still visible and 
thus has impact. The “2002 NACA Technical Report”293 also referred similarly to the fight 
against HIV/AIDS and explained in the introduction that “[HIV/AIDS] poses a paramount threat 
to development in the country as the vast majority of the affected adults are in the prime of their 
productive and reproductive lives.”294  
The remainder of the reports that were analyzed from 2003 through 2004 all contained 
similar references to those outlined above. The “National AIDS Coordination Agency’s National 
HIV/AIDS Strategic Framework for 2003-2009”295 contains several references to the fight against 
HIV/AIDS. In the foreword to the report it is explained that, “this Framework brings all 
stakeholders from every level into the fight. Having declared HIV/AIDS a national emergency, 
this National Strategic Framework is my Government’s pronouncement on how we will continue 
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to address this emergency.”296 As well, the report also outlines how HIV/AIDS is openly 
understood as a threat by explaining that, “HIV/AIDS poses a significant threat to national 
security in terms of loss of human resources and the ability to mobilize for the protection of 
national interests.”297 This is quite significant in that this report, even more so than UN 
documents, acknowledges that HIV/AIDS is a security issue. The exception, to the government 
framing of HIV/AIDS as a security issue, is the “NACA report to the National AIDS Council 
Meeting of the 26th of November.”298 This report contained none of the words that were coded 
for, however this is likely due to the nature of the report, which was focused on data and detailed 
facts and did not discuss government approaches beyond testing, training and condom 
distribution.299  
The speeches that were reviewed provided more evidence of HIV/AIDS being understood 
and accepted as a threat and a security issue. Not including all of the State of the Nation 
Addresses and the Inauguration Address by H.E. Lieutenant General S.K.I. Khama (they 
contained no references), the remainder of the speeches included direct references to the fight 
against HIV/AIDS. Although there is no dramatic increase in the frequency of security language 
from 2002 to 2008, the concept of the fight against HIV/AIDS is repeatedly and consistently 
referenced. For example, in the 2003 BBC interview with President Festus Mogae, the fight 
against HIV/AIDS was discussed throughout.300 Most recently, the 2008 Budget speech illustrates 
the extent of the internalization of HIV/AIDS as a security issue and in part how the Botswana 
government approaches it. The following quote demonstrates this fairly effectively:  
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“Mr. Speaker, I should, in light of these positive developments, express 
Batswana’s gratitude to all our development partners in the fight against 
HIV/AIDS. In particular I wish to single out the USA President’s 
Emergency Programme for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), Africa 
Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnership (ACHAP) and the Global Fund, 
for their invaluable assistance in the battle against the HIV scourge.”301 
 
The Botswana government seems to be quite aware of the urgency and potential threat 
that HIV/AIDS poses internally. It is especially aware that it cannot address it alone, 
explaining that, “Botswana cannot win the war against HIV/AIDS on its own.”302  
In the external (global) securitization of HIV/AIDS that was initiated by the 
UN, Botswana should be understood both as the audience and as a referent object. 
Through this review of government documents and speeches, it is clear that Botswana 
as the audience, has accepted the general international consensus prompted by the 
United Nations, and has internalized HIV/AIDS both as a critical security issue and as 
national security threat (but not as an existential threat). Botswana as the referent 
object is identifying HIV/AIDS as a security threat that it cannot free itself from alone 
and it is calling for and accepting outside assistance to help reduce the increasing 
threat posed by HIV/AIDS. The United Nations explicitly argued for the acceptance of 
HIV/AIDS as a security threat within Sub-Saharan Africa in their securitizing move in 
2000. To reiterate, according to the proposed expanded process of securitization, 
Botswana (as the referent object) has been unable to free itself from the threat posed 
by HIV/AIDS and it required outside help in order to address it. This supports and 
justifies why the United Nations initiated the securitization of HIV/AIDS within Sub-
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Saharan Africa. The United Nations has demonstrated a plan of action and has 
initiated it with global support, acceptance and particularly with global aid.  
 
Facilitating Actors 
Nationally, Botswana has a fairly good relationship with civil society, 
particularly national HIV/AIDS organizations. These organizations are increasingly 
being relied on to help coordinate national efforts to address HIV/AIDS. Reviewing 
the extent of the role of civil society in Botswana’s acceptance of the securitizing 
claims of the UN is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the fact that civil society 
plays an important role in how HIV/AIDS is being addressed within the country, hints 
to the likely influence that they have on how HIV/AIDS is understood and therefore 
securitized.303 The involvement of outside organizations is also important to recognize, 
especially since the country is unable to deal with the epidemic on its own. The 
various organizations, including UNAIDS and the Global Fund, all contribute to 
Botswana’s approach to HIV/AIDS reduction. This leads to a great deal of outside 
influence in how the government recognizes the problem of HIV/AIDS. While beyond 
the capabilities of this study, it is necessary to acknowledge the role of facilitating 
actors such as national and international civil society, in the securitization of 
HIV/AIDS within Botswana.  
 It was difficult to annually track the impact of Botswana’s newspapers on the 
national understanding of HIV/AIDS as a security issue. The archives of the Mmegi 
Online only contain articles as far back as 2003, and it was not possible to search 
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annually. A general search for HIV/AIDS resulted in a total of 977 articles. Through a 
general and unsystematic review of the articles, it is clear that the newspaper openly 
and regularly reviews some of the most pertinent issues associated with HIV/AIDS 
and openly discusses both the national and international fight against HIV/AIDS. An 
article in 2008 clearly connects HIV/AIDS and security by proclaiming that 
“Botswana's political commitment to fight HIV/AIDS is a well known and is an 
enviable fact regionally and internationally.”304 In another article from 2005, 
“[Andrew] Kamanga [Botswana’s National Olympic Committee Coordinator] went 
further to challenge the coaches to fight HIV/AIDS through sport as it is threatening to 
reverse all the developments that have been achieved by this country since 
independence in 1966.”305 As demonstrated by the above excerpt, discussions of the 
impact and severity of HIV/AIDS pervades a wide variety of topics discussed in the 
newspaper. The fight against HIV/AIDS is regularly mentioned, is frequently 
connected to the government and discussed as if it is a national policy. The Mmegi 
Online provides public access to the views of both government and public figures, 
through a fairly open dissemination of information, and in this way, the newspaper 
becomes an important facilitating actor in the securitization of HIV/AIDS.    
 
Success of Securitization Attempt 
In the same way that Canada and the United States have internalized 
HIV/AIDS as a security threat, the above sections have demonstrated that Botswana 
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has accepted and internalized HIV/AIDS as a security threat that needs to be fought. 
However, as far as the Copenhagen process of securitization goes, only one of three 
requirements has been met. HIV/AIDS has been argued to be an existential threat 
within Africa and in turn, Botswana, by the United Nations. The government 
recognizes and openly proclaims the severe threat to both citizens and state from the 
spread of the virus. Ultimately, that alone does not confirm securitization. There needs 
to be extreme measures taken and actions that are beyond the norm for the 
government. Neither of these two conditions has been met and in many ways it is still 



























Politically, Zimbabwe has been experiencing long-term instability, political unrest, 
political violence and widespread intimidation. For almost three decades President Robert 
Mugabe has maintained a heavy-handed approach to his political reign, with widespread reports 
of human rights abuses and blatant acts that undermine democracy and rule of law. Mugabe has 
made concerted efforts to draw international attention away from his questionable policies and 
abuses of power and towards other issues, particularly focusing on the land distribution issue.306 
Recently, the elections in early 2008 brought about more widespread unrest and equally 
widespread violence and intimidation. However, as of February 2009, Morgan Tsvangirai began 
sharing power with Mugabe, as prime minister, the result of a power-sharing deal that was 
originally signed in September 2008.307 The ensuing months will shed even more light on the 
political stability and political future of Zimbabwe. Socially, the country is experiencing fairly 
widespread devastation. The population, estimated in 2007 to be 13,349,000,308 is experiencing 
increasingly prevalent poverty and unemployment, with frequent food shortages and an ongoing 
cholera epidemic that is worsening.309 The spread of HIV/AIDS is only adding to the critical 
nature of the situation as it invariably affects poverty, unemployment, and food security. As a 
result, development is stagnant, and severely threatened. Economically, Zimbabwe is 
experiencing similarly severe problems; in particular, inflation rates have reached an estimated 10 
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million percent. GDP declined an estimated one third between 1999 and 2006 and in 2007 it is 
estimated to have declined a further six percent.310 As a result, GDP per capita was approximated 
to be US$ 133 as of 2006.311  
 Zimbabwe’s capacity to deal with the spread of HIV/AIDS has been seriously reduced as a 
result of the current political, social and economic issues it faces. According to 2007 UNAIDS 
data, national adult HIV prevalence rates were estimated to be around 15.6% and it was further 
estimated that a total of 1,300,000 individuals were infected with HIV.312 This is a significant 
drop from 2001, when adult HIV prevalence in Zimbabwe was estimated to be around 26.5%.313 
Total prevalence estimates between 2001 and 2005 are slightly higher, with estimate of total HIV 
prevalence in 2001 estimated to be 33.7%, and total HIV prevalence in 2005 estimated to be 
approximately 20.1%.314 The government notes that the decline in prevalence is attributable to 
both mortality and a decline in infection rates due to behavioral change.315 In order to deal with 
HIV/AIDS, the Government of Zimbabwe dispersed US$14,700,000 in 2005, US$63,437,000 in 
2006, and US$86,256.00 in 2007.316 The funding comes directly from the Ministry of Finance; 
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the amount includes the National AIDS levy, which is approximately 3%.317   
 
Process of Attempted Securitization of HIV/AIDS 
 
 Unlike Botswana, Zimbabwe has not had and nor will it in the immediate future, a stable 
government capable of committing the necessary attention to HIV/AIDS. However, regardless of 
the ongoing political turmoil, Zimbabwean HIV/AIDS prevalence rates dropped significantly 
between 2000 and 2007.318 This is questionable in a country that has been experiencing regular 
and frequent social and political uncertainty. While it would be a very positive achievement for 
the country, there are other potential explanations for the dramatic decrease in HIV/AIDS 
prevalence rates. The most likely alternative is an extremely high rate of mortality, which would 
offset the HIV/AIDS prevalence rates.319 While a full discussion and review of this issue is 
highly pertinent, it is beyond the expanse of this research. Zimbabwe was selected as a case study 
to contrast with Botswana. While they have two of the highest AIDS rates in the world,320 they 
have different government involvement and commitment to the issue of HIV/AIDS. To 
compound this, they have two very different presidential approaches to national policy formation 
and, as a result, they are likely quite opposite in their approaches to framing HIV/AIDS. It is also 
likely that if security framing of HIV/AIDS is in fact present and regularly used in Zimbabwe, it 
is attributable to the outside influence of the United Nations. Particularly since 2000, the UN has 
                                                 
317 Government of Zimbabwe. “United Nations General Assembly (UNGASS) Report on HIV and AIDS: Follow up 
on the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS,” Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, (2008), 5. Accessed 
online at: http://www.unaids.org/en/CountryResponses/Countries/zimbabwe.asp 
318 According to UNAIDS estimates. See Figure 2, page 29, for details.  
319 Theo Smart, “Zimbabwe observes a reduction in HIV prevalence, but why?” Wednesday, July 05, 2006.  
Available online at: http://www.aidsmap.com/en/news/90F01421-E63D-465A-BB79-
4A44EEF6E9AE.asp?type=preview . 
320 Botswana was estimated to be at 26.5% in 2001 and 23.9 in 2007, while Zimbabwe was estimated to be at 26% in 
2001 and 15.3% in 2007. Swaziland actually has the second highest prevalence rate to Botswana, with 26.3% in 
2001 and 26.1% in 2007, however it experienced virtually no decrease in prevalence and as a result, it was decided it 
would not be a good case study for this research. UNAIDS estimates from UNAIDS Global Report 2008.  
 
 114
been involved in working with African countries to reduce the prevalence of HIV/AIDS rates. 
The close interaction of the UN with the governments inevitably affects how the government 
approaches HIV/AIDS and thus how they understand it. This is a major assumption and it is not 
meant to be final or comprehensive. It is meant to acknowledge the influence of the United 
Nations and to build an argument for future research into this topic. With very little previous 
research on this issue, some assumptions are necessary in order to move forward.  
 Zimbabwe presented a similar pattern to that of Botswana, with repeated references to the 
fight against HIV/AIDS and the threat to security/development recurring throughout many 
presidential speeches, albeit not with as much frequency. Also similarly to Botswana, there was 
an increased prevalence of security language within reports, as opposed to the speeches. While 
the details of their approaches to HIV/AIDS reduction may differ, the framing language remains 
very similar between the two countries. It is necessary to note that three of the speeches that were 
coded contained no security language referring to HIV/AIDS. The first was the Address to 
Parliament on the 22nd of July 2003, the second was State of the Nation the Address by President 
Mugabe on the 6th of December 2005, and the third was the Address by the President on the 27th 
Independence Anniversary on April 18th 2007.321 When HIV/AIDS was discussed, such as during 
the Seventeenth State of the Nation Address by President Robert Mugabe on the 9th of December 
2004,322 Mugabe describes it as “by far the biggest threat to the health of the population.”323 He 
further elaborated at the Asian Africa Summit in 2005, when he explains that “further challenges 
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include growing cases of transnational crimes, poverty and the HIV/AIDS pandemic, all of which 
constitute a formidable threat to the new world we would like to bequeath to our posterity.”324 
Although brief, and not discussed in depth during speeches for the majority of Mugabe’s 
speeches that discuss HIV/AIDS, he uses security language. 
 Within Zimbabwean reports however, HIV/AIDS is frequently and explicitly described 
using security language. In particular, within the National AIDS Council (NAC) 2004 Annual 
Report, the review of the status of the Millennium Development Goals and the Zimbabwe 
HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan for 2006-2010, HIV/AIDS is framed in the same manner as the three 
previous countries. The NAC was bestowed the responsibility of coordinating and managing the 
government of Zimbabwe’s HIV/AIDS strategy.325 The 2004 Annual report clarifies that “the 
Government of Zimbabwe realized its responsibility to provide the required leadership to 
mobilize national efforts to combat the HIV and AIDS epidemic.”326 The Council’s function is 
made even more explicit under the section, Functions and Powers of the Council, where it is 
explained that the role of the Council is to “do all things which in the Board’s opinion are 
necessary or appropriate to combat HIV and AIDS and to ameliorate the effects of those 
diseases.”327 The Zimbabwe Millennium Development Goals 2004 Progress Report continues in 
the same direction and further incorporates the framing of HIV/AIDS as a security issue.328 There 
is an increased use of security language in this particular report but it diverges away from the 
usual choice of fight against HIV/AIDS; this likely results from the UN’s original choice of 
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separate from the unstable political environment, and has been given full authority to act alone. Again, this is one 
possibility, if the decrease is a real phenomenon unaffected by mortality rates.  
326 Zimbabwe National AIDS Council 2004 Annual Report. Executive Summary, 4.  
327 Ibid., 6.  
328 Zimbabwe Millennium Development Goals. 2004 Progress Report. 
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language when drafting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).329 The framing of 
HIV/AIDS in the UN’s Millennium Development Goals is different than the language choice of 
most countries; it uses combat instead of fight. The language in Zimbabwe’s Strategic Plan for 
2006-2010 returns to favouring the phrase fight against HIV/AIDS and thus clearly situates 
Zimbabwe with Botswana in the process of securitization. 330 
 Like Botswana, the Zimbabwean policy documents and numerous speeches regularly 
invoke what this paper has identified as security language. The review of Zimbabwean material 
further demonstrated the frequent use of the phrase fight against HIV/AIDS. It is clear that the 
security language is not accidental. Zimbabwe has internalized HIV/AIDS as a critical security 
issue and a national security threat. Like Botswana, Zimbabwe is both the audience for the 
external securitization of HIV/AIDS, and the referent object. As the audience, through the 
internalization of HIV/AIDS, Zimbabwe has accepted the securitization as argued by the United 
Nations. As the referent object, Zimbabwe was unable to manage or reduce the increasing threat 
posed by HIV/AIDS and it required outside help in order to address the threat posed by 
HIV/AIDS. With such high prevalence rates, it required urgent and immediate attention. In turn, 
the UN and other international organizations are now actively involved in helping to reduce 
HIV/AIDS within Zimbabwe.   
 
Facilitating Actors 
 Unlike Botswana, it has been argued that Zimbabwe does not have conciliatory relations 
                                                 
329 Goal 6 is to combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Other Diseases. This word choice openly frames HIV/AIDS with a 
security initiative and as a result all who join this initiative will assume this same approach.  
330 Zimbabwe National HIV and AIDS Strategic Plan, 2006-2010.  
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with national and regional civil society.331 As a result, the likelihood that civil society has an 
impact on how Zimbabwe identifies HIV/AIDS is quite low. The most likely facilitating actors 
for Zimbabwe are international organizations that directly affect the budget that Zimbabwe 
receives for HIV/AIDS. As a result, UNAIDS and the Global Fund are again the most likely 
influences for how Zimbabwe perceives the securitization of HIV/AIDS. Jake Batsell clarifies 
why Zimbabwe has failed to rely on NGOs for HIV/AIDS support, by explaining that “a political 
regime primarily concerned with preserving its own power can undermine the capacity of NGOs 
to respond to a public health crisis, either by overtly intimidating the NGO sector or by simply 
choosing not to fully engage the NGO.”332 Zimbabwe can choose not to engage with national and 
regional civil society but it must to some extent engage the major HIV/AIDS funding 
organizations. The UN funding organizations likely have the easiest and most consistent contact 
with Zimbabwe and in turn the most influence.  
 A full archives search of The Sunday Independent revealed a large number of articles 
discussing not only HIV/AIDS but also the so-called battle against HIV/AIDS. Beginning in 
2002, and annual search for ‘HIV/AIDS’ was completed. Between January 1, 2002 and January 
1, 2003, there were 167 articles published on HIV/AIDS; between January 1, 2003 and 2004, 
205; between January 1, 2004 and 2005, 221; between January 1, 2005 and 2006, 142; between 
January 1, 2006 and 2007,146; between January 1, 2007 and 2008, 152; and finally between 
January 1, 2008 and 2009, 120.333 As demonstrated above, the newspaper published repeated 
articles that discussed HIV/AIDS, including those with headings such as: “Boost for Fight 
                                                 
331 Jake Batsell. “AIDS, Politics, and NGOs in Zimbabwe,” in Amy Patterson, ed., The African State and the AIDS 
Crisis. (England and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005). 
332 Jake Batsell. “AIDS, Politics, and NGOs in Zimbabwe,” in Amy Patterson, ed., The African State and the AIDS 
Crisis. (England and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005), 59. 






Against AIDS,”334 “AIDS Battle set for huge boosts,”335 and “US plan to fight Aids in Africa.”336 
The newspaper provides fairly open and direct access to how outside organizations and states are 
addressing and framing HIV/AIDS. In this way, the newspaper plays an active role in transferring 
the international understanding of HIV/AIDS to readers of the newspaper.   
 
Success of Securitization Attempt 
 With regards to the success of securitization efforts, according to the Copenhagen school 
process, they have been unsuccessful. Like Botswana, one of the three requirements has been 
met; the existential threat requirement has been argued by the United Nations. However, neither 
within the UN nor within Botswana have the other two requirements been met. No measures that 
can be considered as emergency measures have been put in place and no actions have gone 
beyond the normal political procedures. Although HIV/AIDS as a security issue is internalized 
and frequently invoked, securitization itself has not been completed.  
 The following chapter provides a summary of the overall success or failure of the 
securitization efforts within the UN and within all four of the governments’ that were reviewed. 
As well, it offers future research directions and questions that should be pursued before any 
further solid conclusions can be made about a global securitization. 
 
                                                 
334 The Sunday Independent Online. “Boost for Fight Against AIDS,” November 30, 2002. Accessed Online at: 
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This paper has traced the Copenhagen process of securitization by employing it to analyze 
how HIV/AIDS is being globally framed and addressed as a security issue. In order to do so, this 
paper focused first and foremost on the discourse of the United Nations as the ultimate norm 
promoting international organization. It traced whether UN attempts to externally (globally) 
securitize HIV/AIDS were successful, by first and foremost using discourse analysis. It 
discovered that starting with the 2000 prompting of the United Nations, there was an increase in 
attention and priority given to HIV/AIDS within the four selected countries. There was also a 
discernable increase in what has been deemed security language when the countries each referred 
to and discussed how to address HIV/AIDS.  
From the analysis of UN documents and the visible increase in attention given to 
HIV/AIDS and security, it seems clear that within the organization, HIV/AIDS has successfully 
been internalized and accepted, however, this does not mean it has been successfully securitized. 
The security discourse has become internalized and incorporated into most UN debates that 
surround the increasing prevalence of HIV/AIDS, the impact of HIV/AIDS on African stability 
and the debates surrounding the global threat that HIV/AIDS poses. Action plans have been 
developed and are in the process of execution. Furthermore, the UN continues to explore and 
promote, through various discourses, the concept of HIV/AIDS as a security issue and as a 
security threat.  
With regards to the external attempt to securitize, it has not been successful, as concluded 
below in the section on the success of securitization attempt. However, the continual attention 
and reiteration of the argument has extended the argument beyond the confines of the United 
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Nations. The internalization of HIV/AIDS as a security issue is now identifiable within the 
national governments. The internalization may be globally occurring but this paper can only 
reflect the extent of it within the four country specific case studies. Before discussing the failure 
of securitization, the following will briefly review the extent of the internalization of HIV/AIDS 
as a security issue. 
Within Canada and the United States, following 2000 and 2001, increased attention and 
debate on HIV/AIDS as a security issue did noticeably occur. Reports and bills have been 
published and passed, and departments have been allocated responsibility for dealing entirely 
with the issue of HIV/AIDS in the global context. Overall, Canada takes a more reserved and 
classic Canadian humanitarian foreign policy stance, while the United States takes a more 
militaristic stance, also in keeping with their traditional foreign policy roles. The United States 
presents more rhetorical and grandiose statements on the topic of HIV/AIDS and security and in 
some ways the high prevalence of the associations between HIV/AIDS and security language 
demonstrate an attempt to further promote this concept. With regards to policy approaches to 
HIV/AIDS, both Canada and the United States have committed large sums of money. There were 
substantial increases in funding from both countries following the United Nations meetings on 
HIV/AIDS and resolution 1308 in 2000. From this study, it seems clear that these two 
governments have internalized and continue to identify HIV/AIDS as a global security threat.  
Within both Zimbabwe and Botswana the results were not as expected; however, they 
further supported the occurrence of a top down, global internalization of HIV/AIDS as a security 
issue. Before beginning the research, it was postulated that the African countries would only 
discuss HIV/AIDS within the context of a health issue. However, this was not the case. In part, 
this may be attributable to the close relationship that the United Nations has with African 
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countries regarding their national AIDS strategies. Both countries, despite their very different 
government structures, framed HIV/AIDS with security language. In some of the speeches that 
were reviewed, language that resembled rallying discourse was used; meaning that, the way in 
which the speeches were formed and the references to battles and wars against HIV/AIDS, 
seemed to demonstrate that the governments were calling on the citizens to join with them in 
addressing the epidemic. There is regular communication maintained with the UN and several 
UN organizations play a key role in helping to reduce HIV/AIDS prevalence rates within African 
countries. Both countries are employing monitored approaches to addressing the spread of 
HIV/AIDS.  
What the analysis demonstrated was a wide spread internalization of HIV/AIDS as a 
security issue, not only within Africa but also more globally. By tracing the impact of the UN 
meetings and resolutions from 2000, the role of the United Nations was also clarified. Between 
2000 and 2001, there was a clear change in all four governments approaches to HIV/AIDS 
globally and also nationally within Botswana and Zimbabwe. Budget increases particularly 
demonstrated how seriously they took the claims. After 2000, the increase in references to the 
global fight against HIV/AIDS, and the widespread prevalent use of the phrase as a slogan in 
presidential speeches, civil society reports and newspaper headlines, reveals how internalized and 
accepted it has become.   
 
Success of Securitization Attempts: Conclusions 
Although there is a clear acceptance of HIV/AIDS as a security issue, and clear 
international attention given to address the issue, ultimately, audience acceptance of speech acts 
alone does not lead to successful securitization. After reviewing each of the case studies, it is 
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clear that according to the Copenhagen school, the securitization of HIV/AIDS has been 
unsuccessful. The United Nations was the securitizing actor, and it made key securitizing moves 
toward referent objects that initiated a successful internal securitization of HIV/AIDS, that lead 
to an external securitization of HIV/AIDS, which has ultimately failed.  
All of the initial steps successfully occurred; however, the three main criteria for 
successful securitization are missing; they need to occur, in order to confirm successful 
securitization. With regards to step one, while HIV/AIDS was framed in such a manner that it 
could be understood as an existential threat to Africa, it was not framed as such for a global 
securitization. While this step was present and accepted in the case of Africa, it is a moot point, 
because neither of the other two steps took place. First, extreme measures were not taken to 
address HIV/AIDS within the United Nations, or in any of the four countries reviewed. Second, 
there was no action initiated through channels beyond normal political procedures. Every action 
that took place in order to address the HIV/AIDS epidemic fell within the political norm. 
While the key above-outlined steps were unsuccessful, the final necessary step, audience 
acceptance, was successful in certain respects. To clarify, as the audience to the United Nations’ 
attempt to securitize HIV/AIDS within Africa, Canada and the United States have readily 
accepted the argument that HIV/AIDS is a security issue. Furthermore, each Country’s financial 
contributions, international support and international participation go far beyond a focus on 
African security alone, confirming their recognition of HIV/AIDS as a global security issue. 
However, according to the Copenhagen school of securitization, the audience has not accepted 
HIV/AIDS as an existential threat, which in turn justifies emergency measures beyond the norm.  
Botswana and Zimbabwe have both supported and internalized HIV/AIDS as a security 
issue, as both the audience and the referent objects for the United Nations securitization attempts. 
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As both the audience and the referent objects for the securitization of HIV/AIDS, they were 
actively involved in the process. As far as the attempt by the United Nations to securitize 
HIV/AIDS within Africa, both countries actively accepted the argument. As the audience, they 
have internalized the national threat of HIV/AIDS and are using it within their own government 
documents and speeches. As the referents, they have both prompted and accepted the proposition 
that HIV/AIDS is a security threat within Africa. This is confirmed as they both identified that 
they needed outside help and they both required outside intervention and aid in order to reduce 
and manage the internal threat posed by the virus. 
As demonstrated above, regardless of how much the various audiences accepted the 
speech acts by the United Nations, the Copenhagen process of securitization was not successful.  
This paper has established, for those who argued that HIV/AIDS is not a security issue, that it is 
in fact being framed as such by both the United Nations and by the reviewed national 
governments. The attempt to internally securitize HIV/AIDS within the UN is argued to be 
successful but the UN attempt to externally securitize HIV/AIDS, has not been. While this paper 
traced the securitization of HIV/AIDS according to the Copenhagen school process of 
securitization, and found it unsuccessful, this paper finds it not necessarily a failure of the attempt 
but actually a flaw of the Copenhagen process of securitization. It is argued that the framework 
itself has failed.  
In essence, it has become clear that the current Copenhagen school process of 
securitization is inadequate and lacking the ability to fully engage in the study of new and 
emerging non-traditional threats. Particularly, it cannot take into account how the international 
system has changed, how the roles of states have changed and how states react and engage each 
other to reduce threats that are international in nature. Furthermore, it is found that there are 
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specific remnants of traditional security studies that are impeding the effectiveness of this 
framework. The three main criteria that are required for successful securitization are no longer 
able to fully engage in the study of how actors securitize today’s threats. The existential threat 
requirement is at the same time vague and restrictive. There are many people who are constantly 
existentially threatened but their state of being is not considered an urgent security issue. As well, 
threats are not always framed or identified by the actor as existential in nature but they are framed 
in such a way that they are called upon to be immediately addressed for the sake of stability and 
security. With regards to emergency measures, again, this designation is no longer encompassing 
of how states in the international system regularly deal with security issues. The same critique 
applies to action beyond normal political measures. A state, or actors within a state, would not 
react to current security issues by avoiding measures and rules guiding their actions in such a 
situation. There is a great deal of accountability in place and to react in such a manner is no 
longer internationally or nationally accepted. This is not to say that securitization in this form will 
not occur, but simply that these criteria are somewhat outdated and therefore the analyst can miss 
or overlook key instances of security and securitization.    
 As such, this paper finds it necessary to further develop the current Copenhagen process 
of securitization. This is not a suggestion for an alternative method of analysis but instead a 
development of the current framework, which is still quite useful and insightful. In an attempt to 
further clarify where these major weaknesses are and to propose potential solutions, the following 
section provides a review of the key concepts that are identified as preventing the framework 




 Beyond a Copenhagen Process of Securitization  
 
 
After testing the Copenhagen process of securitization it is argued that there are flaws 
within the framework itself and there should be a clarified understanding of securitization. A 
different understanding of securitization is most needed, because the process in its current state is 
unable to properly engage in the analysis of how HIV/AIDS is being framed and elevated to the 
level of a security issue by the United Nations and various national governments. Traditionally, 
in security studies, security issues were only recognized as falling within either military or 
political sectors. Buzan et al. support the generally accepted broadening of the sectors under 
which security issues can be recognized. The process of securitization can be more widely 
employed than it was originally intended. The main areas of concern that have become clear after 
testing the theory are the following requirements: labeling as an existential threat; emergency 
measures; action beyond normal political procedures. Additional areas that should be further 
reviewed include: the threat recognition by actors and the labeling of referents as objects rather 
than actors in the process. It is within these areas that the following sections attempt to develop 
the Copenhagen process of securitization. Each of these areas is addressed and an alternative 
proposed that would allow for a more holistic study of how actors are engaging in security 
discussions. Keeping in mind the potential of the security trap discussed earlier, and the fact that 
HIV/AIDS as a security issue remains a contentious connection, this paper finds it necessary to 
update the Copenhagen school process of securitization in order to ensure that the framework is 
capable of analyzing today’s non-traditional security issues. Therefore, the following sections 
provide both a critique of the current Copenhagen process of securitization and suggestions of 




Key Requirements for an Expanded Copenhagen Process of Securitization 
 The conditions that threats are presented as existential threats, require emergency 
measures, and actions beyond normal reactive procedures, are in many ways reminiscent of 
traditional cold war security approaches. Current national and international security threats are 
generally addressed much more diplomatically, carefully and according to specific predefined 
actions and laws. Emergency action that goes beyond normal political channels is taken very 
rarely and as a last resort. Most security issues are currently addressed through political channels 
and with action that cannot be classified as extreme. These three requirements assume that 
current security issues are presented and addressed immediately, and extremely. These 
requirements may now have become detrimental to the applicability of the Copenhagen process 
of securitization.  
First and foremost, the existential threat requirement does not provide the conceptual 
clarity that it should. Depending on various factors, including the region under investigation, the 
same threat can pose differing levels of danger. Furthermore, today’s emerging threats are not 
necessarily immediately existentially threatening, nor are they always going to affect the 
existence of an individual or state. On the other hand, many ethnic or national groups are 
existentially threatened for extended periods of time but it is not necessarily recognized 
nationally or internationally as a security issue, nor will it benefit being labeled as such. This 
paper suggests re-labeling it as a critical threat rather than an existential threat. Critical was 
chosen because it refers specifically to an urgent or dangerous issue that has to be immediately 
addressed.337 This paper proposes that critical in this sense is directly associated with the ability 
of the state to manage the issue and to reduce its potential harm. An issue may become critical 
                                                 
337 The Oxford English Dictionary defines critical as “at a point of danger or crisis.” Catherine Soanes, ed., 
Paperback Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 2002), 193. 
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when it can no longer be managed, or the harm prevented, by the referent or the actor that is 
meant to protect the referent. Thus, depending on the region and the referent being analyzed, the 
point at which it becomes critical will vary. The designation of critical allows for a wider 
recognition of issues than those that are existentially threatening but it also narrows the potential 
issues to only those that are most imminent. Issues that reach a critical level may not always be 
existentially threatening, but they will likely have more widespread, more devastating, and long-
term destabilizing effects, thus leading to greater overall insecurity and potentially greater loss of 
life. Today’s non-traditional threats are not necessarily intentionally causing a threat, and many 
threats are not capable of demonstrating intent, as is the case with HIV/AIDS. The existential 
threat definition excludes many of these emerging non-traditional security threats, including 
those related to insecurities associated with health, water, food, and climate change. The 
importance of critical in this process of securitization is further elaborated in following section 
that explains the proposed critical threshold. 
With regards to extreme measures and actions beyond normal reactive procedures, since 
few would risk going outside mandated procedures, these requirements are overly limiting. As 
security concerns have become more global, and consequences of action more widespread and 
sensitive, national and international action has become much more regulated. International 
security decisions generally follow specific procedures; one exception to this rule is the American 
administration’s disregard of the United Nations decision not to invade Iraq. Within Canada and 
the United States, most decisions with regards to issues of security are made after much political 
debate and review. Even most recently, with regards to the widely proclaimed financial crisis and 




There is also more clarity needed surrounding the identification and recognition of threats. 
By analyzing and judging threats based on their individual traits (war, hunger, disease, natural 
disasters) the full extent of the insecurity created can never be understood. The reality is that the 
severity of the threat is inextricably linked to the referent actors who are involved, and their 
ability to pacify it, and the context of the situation. While a threat may not be identified as 
existentially threatening, it may have long-term, widespread and more severe impacts for the 
referent. Is the referent a state, or a region, or the international system as a whole? If it is a 
region, what is the historical background and context that put the region in the situation? Are 
there other situations ongoing that affect the region to deal with the threat? These are all context 
specific issues that can be overlooked. Furthermore, the complexity of the international system 
adds to the problematic nature of the current Copenhagen process of securitization. Take the 
financial crisis for example: while it has been heralded by some as a security issue in itself, it is 
arguable indirectly affecting the security and stability of many developing countries. In effect, the 
financial crisis poses a security threat for developing nations. How is it going to affect their 
access to critical international aid? How is it going to affect their jobs, their access to food, their 
political stability? These are complex dynamics that this paper argues the Copenhagen process of 
securitization is not capable of grasping. 
Security scholars should not be arguing for or against a widening or narrowing of the 
paradigm, but instead for a new method of analyzing the threats that arise on an individual case-
by-case basis. This paper suggests doing that by arguing for the inclusion of a critical threshold, 
which allows for the potential identification of new and emerging threats. The threshold (see 
below) would be used as an indicator for when issues should be addressed and treated as security 
threats in policies and government actions. Itemizing a permanent list of what does and does not 
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constitute a threat is not a beneficial approach to the global problems at hand. The status of a 
threat is ultimately dependent on the context, the affected actors, the system and the ability of the 
system to address the threat.  
How an issue reaches the point of identification by the securitizing actor as a threat is not 
extensively explored within the Copenhagen school but it is arguably an important part of the 
process. The ensuing critical threshold has been proposed in order to expand the potential 
applications of the process of securitization. It has greater analytic potential, due to the fact that it 
does not restrict what issues can become potential security issues. Instead, it offers a context 
specific tool, that aims to help identify how and why issues become recognized as security issues, 
regardless of the sectors within which they fall. In essence, the critical threshold demonstrates 
when issues have become so significant, to the point where their impact should be visible to 
securitizing actors, and in turn the likelihood or probability that they will become securitized is 
greatest. It may also be useful as a policy tool to recommend or argue when an issue should or 
should not be securitized. Furthermore, the critical threshold could provide further legitimacy for 
securitizing actors and policy makers by demonstrating which issues are the most pressing, and 
potentially threatening.  
In this situation the term critical means that an issue has become dire and in need of urgent 
attention; in other words, if left unresolved it may lead to the devastation of the threatened system 
or actor and to the inability of them to function properly in their intended role. The critical 
threshold is intended to help identify when existent issues of insecurity become critical, by 
identifying when the referent actor can no longer manage the threat, or reduce the insecurity 
posed by the issue. The use of critical instead of existential avoids some of the problems and 
misgivings that the use of existential threat implies. As well, the use of critical imposes a tipping 
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point urgency to the recognition of the threat. This paper proposes that it is the inability of the 
referent actors to manage and reduce the harm from certain issues that warrants the identification 
of them as critical. Thus, it is the referent actors’ inability to achieve freedom from the potential 
threat, without outside intervention or help that indicates when the issue has surpassed the 
critical threshold. 338 The critical threshold is not predefined and it will be different for each case. 
In order to identify when the critical threshold has been met, regional differences need to be 
accounted for. In this paper those regional differences are divided between developed and 
developing countries. The following model especially focuses on the critical threshold within 
developing countries.339 
Freedom or the inability to achieve freedom from a threat is used as the indicator for when 
an issue has become critical and therefore identifiable as a potential security issue. When an issue 
has become critical, it is capable of threatening the stability and security of the referent actor. At 
this point, the securitizing actor is able to identify the issue as a security threat and if the actor 
does, the proposed process of securitization will be initiated, thus openly identifying it as a 
critical threat. It will not become recognized as a security threat until securitization is successful.  
It is important to add that when an issue passes the critical threshold, it does not guarantee 
that an actor will identify it as a security issue in a securitizing move but it demonstrates an 
increased likelihood that it will be visible as a potential security issue. Whether a securitizing 
actor identifies an issue as critical and thus in need of securitization ultimately depends on the 
actors perceived understanding of what is critical and what is a threat. This understanding of 
securitization is not intended to be all encompassing and it certainly does not prevent an actor 
                                                 
338 Outside help, in this case refers to either states or international organizations, through: military support, 
humanitarian aid, monetary donations or loans, and all other sorts of outside help that is given to countries 
experiencing insecurity within their economic, social or political realms.  
339 Refer to Figure 3, page 76, for a demonstration of the transition from existent threat to critical threat. 
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from securitizing a non-critical issue, or not securitizing a critical issue. Finally, the threshold is 
not only intended for the expansion of the process of securitization, it can also help to clarify for 
analysts and practitioners when and which issues may become understood as security threats.  
Proposed Updated Process of Securitization 
 
The following chart demonstrates the suggested updates to the Copenhagen process of 
securitization, including the pre-securitization threat recognition. The process is as follows. Step 
one, the critical threshold: An existing issue of insecurity, in this case HIV/AIDS, becomes 
elevated to an unmanageable level by other existing factors. These factors are specific facilitating 
conditions (demonstrated through the grey circles) that interact with the existent issue to increase 
the threat posed and the probability that it reaches a critical level. The factors are conditional on 
the type of issue, threatened actor and the region under investigation. In the case of HIV/AIDS in 
Sub-Saharan Africa the conditions may be poverty, political instability, economic instability, 
migration, conflict, lack of access to medicines, or some combination of all of the above. These 
factors are problematic on their own, but in combination and based on the ability of the state to 
manage them, they can exacerbate the system to the point where the state is no longer able to 
manage the most pressing potential threat, thus exacerbating the overall state of insecurity. This 
failure of the referent to break free from the greatest insecurity, posed by HIV/AIDS in this case, 
indicates that the issue has reached a critical level. 
Step two: Once the issue has become critical, it passes the critical threshold and can be 
recognized as a critical threat. This does not guarantee it will be securitized, but it has increased 
the probability and should be visible as a potential threat. The likelihood that it will be securitized 




Figure 6: Proposed Model for Process of Threat Recognition and Securitization of HIV/AIDS 
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Steps three through five: There are many issues that may meet the above criteria; however 
only when a securitizing actor recognizes and then identifies the issue, can it begin the process of 
securitization. The process is initiated through various discourses (speech acts), and the issue is 
framed as a security threat towards the referent actor. Steps six through seven: In the actor’s 
speech act, the issue is presented as requiring action and requiring immediate and urgent attention 
but does not need to be framed as an existential threat; rather it needs to demonstrate that there 
will be clear security implications if action is not taken. As a result, in order to achieve successful 
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securitization, there needs to both be a demonstration of a plan of action that may or may not go 
beyond normal reactive measures, and a demonstration that the plan is being executed.340 Step 
eight: Finally, only after an audience accepts the issue as a real and urgent security threat, can it 
be considered or identified as securitized. The audience acceptance does not have to be explicit, it 
can be similar to norm internalization, and can be reflected in the audience’s own referral to the 
issue as a threat. This may be identifiable through clear and traceable changes in discourse, and in 
the acceptance and use of the securitizing language. As well, it is traceable through action taken 
towards the identified threat. 
 
Final Conclusions 
This paper concludes by proposing that the benefit of updating the Copenhagen process of 
securitization is especially applicable within developing, third world, and failed states. These are 
areas where understandings of security and insecurity are constructed quite differently than 
within developed countries. As a result, it is much more pressing to develop a method of 
securitization that can be applied to study how security issues are approached and securitized, as 
well as how security threats are being identified within developing countries.  
This paper has attempted to highlight the active role that the United Nations is playing in 
the international system, particularly with regards to the international understanding of 
HIV/AIDS and security. While the overarching attempt to test and demonstrate the successful 
securitization of HIV/AIDS was effectively unsuccessful, this study helped to demonstrate 
clearly that HIV/AIDS is not simply being addressed as a health issue. Governments are actively 
participating and engaging in discussions about the severe implications from the spread of the 
                                                 
340 This paper finds Sjöstedt’s work in this area is very informative and has incorporated it into this proposed model.  
Sjöstedt, "Exploring the Construction of Threats: The Securitization of HIV/AIDS in Russia," 10. 
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virus. Furthermore, while a failure in practice, this study has helped to highlight some areas 
where the Copenhagen process of securitization can be further developed in order to provide even 
more intellectual clarity.  
In summary, and perhaps most importantly, the impact and repercussions of framing 
HIV/AIDS as a security issue needs further study, as it invariably changes international relations, 
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ACHAP: Africa Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnership 
AIDS:  Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome 
ARV:  Antiretroviral, medicine that can help reduce the onslaught of the AIDS virus, and 
prolong a patient’s life. 
CDC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.) 
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency (US) 
CIDA: Canadian International Development Agency 
CSHA: Canadian Strategy on HIV/AIDS 
CSS: Critical security studies (overall security paradigm, not to be mistaken with CSS, 
the Welch school within CSS) 
CSWs: Commercial Sex Workers 
DFAIT: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canadian) 
DPKO: Department of Peacekeeping Operations (United Nations) 
DRC:  Democratic Republic of the Congo 
ECOSOC: UN Economic and Social Council 
FAO:   Food and Agricultural Organization 
GDP:  Gross Domestic Product 
Global Fund: The Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria 
HDR:  Human Development Report 
HHS:  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
HIV:  Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
IOs:   International Organizations 
MDGs: Millennium Development Goals 
NACA: National AIDS Coordination Agency (Botswana) 
 
 168
NAC:  National AIDS Council (Zimbabwe) 
NGOs:  Non-Governmental Organizations 
PEPFAR: The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
PHAC: Public Health Agency of Canada 
SSA:  Sub-Saharan Africa 
SC:  United Nations Security Council  
UN:   United Nations 
UNAIDS: The United Nations Joint Programme on HIV/AIDS 
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme 
UNGASS: United Nations General Assembly Special Session on AIDS 
UNSC:  United Nations Security Council 
USAID: United States Agency for International Development 
WHO:  World Health Organization 
